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The Exigent Circumstances Exception to the Pre-Petition
Credit Counseling Requirement Under the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005:
Exigent or Extreme?
Victoria L. VanZandt*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 20051 ("BAPCPA") substantially revised the bankruptcy laws in the
United States. One change, the pre-petition credit counseling require-
ment in 11 U.S.C. § 109(h), 2 has created an obstacle for unwitting in-
dividuals who attempt to file following the effective date of the
amendments. Congress envisioned a pre-petition credit counseling re-
quirement could heighten financial literacy among potential debtors
and ultimately steer them away from bankruptcy, demonstrating alter-
natives to a bankruptcy filing.3 To complement the goal of financial
literacy, Congress also mandated subsequent to filing, and as a re-
quirement to obtain a discharge, debtors must complete a financial
management course to educate them further and to assist them in
managing their finances post-petition. 4
Although laudatory goals, Congress recognized there should be ex-
ceptions from the pre-petition credit counseling requirement and,
therefore, created three methods by which individuals could avoid the
requirement. Two of the methods, enumerated in § 109(h)(2) and
§ 109(h)(4), provide a complete exemption to the requirement upon
the fulfillment of the elements of the exceptions.5 However, the third
method, found in § 109(h)(3), the "exigent circumstances" exception,
provides only a "temporary deferral" of the requirement for individu-
als who are facing exigent circumstances and who are unable to obtain
* Assistant Professor of Lawyering Skills, University of Dayton School of Law; J.D., Univer-
sity of Dayton School of Law; B.A., Ohio State University.
1. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) (2006). See infra note 17 for the full text of § 109(h).
3. See infra Part III, outlining the legislative purpose of § 109(h).
4. See id. §§ 727(a)(11), 1328(g)(1).
5. See id. § 109(h)(2), (4).
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the counseling prior to filing. 6 The "temporary deferral" found in
§ 109(h)(3) appears to serve no purpose whatsoever, other than re-
quiring certain debtors, who meet its requirements, to pay for a credit
counseling course that provides "alternatives" to bankruptcy after fil-
ing. The reasoning is circular: how can credit counseling designed to
provide alternatives to bankruptcy and to steer individuals away from
bankruptcy be of any assistance once one has already filed for bank-
ruptcy? Why provide a true exemption from the requirement for indi-
viduals meeting certain criteria and not others? If financial education
is the goal, for the individual who does not receive the counseling pre-
petition, why does the BAPCPA mandated post-petition financial
management course not satisfy that requirement? These questions and
others are posited by the "temporary deferral" provided for in
§ 109(h)(3)(B). 7
This Article first outlines the pre-petition credit counseling require-
ment found in § 109(h) and the three exceptions to the requirement
with particular emphasis on § 109(h)(3). 8 A review of the legislative
history of § 109(h)(3) and criticism of § 109(h)(3) follows. 9 Then, the
Article reviews the case law addressing this section since its enact-
ment. 10 The Article concludes that due to the confusion over its appli-
cation and its inability to meet the blurred goals of Congress, the
enactment of additional guidelines are needed to provide substance to
the language of § 109(h)(3) and guidance to the courts interpreting
the section, in an overall objective for consistency." With a strict
framework in place, the section should then become, like its counter-
parts in § 109(h)(2) and § 109(h)(4), a true exemption and not a "tem-
porary deferral. '12
II. THE LANGUAGE OF § 109(H): NOT A MODEL
OF CONCISE LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING
Entitled "Who may be a debtor," § 109 of the Bankruptcy Code
("Code") sets forth who may be a debtor under the Code.1 3 This eligi-
bility section has been an initial hurdle for any debtor under the Code
since its original enactment. Prior to BAPCPA and subsequent to its
6. § 109(h)(3). See infra note 17 for the full text of § 109(h)(3).
7. See § 109(h)(3)(B).
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See infra Part V.
13. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).
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passage, § 109 establishes residency and domicile requirements, 14 re-
quirements to be a debtor under particular chapters,1 5 and eligibility
to file after a dismissal of a previously filed case.16 BAPCPA added a
new eligibility requirement, § 109(h), 17 under which an individual
must receive credit counseling prior to filing a petition under any
14. § 109(a).
15. § 109(b) (delineating requirements to be a debtor under Chapter 7); § 109(c) (delineating
requirements to be a debtor under Chapter 9); § 109(d) (delineating requirements to be a debtor
under Chapter 11); § 109(e) (delineating requirements to be a debtor under Chapter 13);
§ 109(f) (delineating requirements to be a debtor under Chapter 12).
16. § 109(g).
17. Section 109(h) provides:
(h)(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), and notwithstanding any other provision of
this section, an individual may not be a debtor under this title unless such individual
has, during the 180-day period preceding the date of filing of the petition by such indi-
vidual, received from an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency de-
scribed in section 111(a) an individual or group briefing (including a briefing conducted
by telephone or on the Internet) that outlined the opportunities for available credit
counseling and assisted such individual in performing a related budget analysis.
(2)(A) Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to a debtor who resides in a district
for which the United States trustee (or the bankruptcy administrator, if any) deter-
mines that the approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agencies for such dis-
trict are not reasonably able to provide adequate services to the additional individuals
who would otherwise seek credit counseling from such agencies by reason of the re-
quirements of paragraph (1).
(B) The United States trustee (or the bankruptcy administrator, if any) who makes a
determination described in subparagraph (A) shall review such determination not later
than 1 year after the date of such determination, and not less frequently than annually
thereafter. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, a nonprofit budget and credit
counseling agency may be disapproved by the United States trustee (or the bankruptcy
administrator, if any) at any time.
(3)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the requirements of paragraph (1) shall not apply
with respect to a debtor who submits to the court a certification that-
(i) describes exigent circumstances that merit a waiver of the requirements of para-
graph (1);
(ii) states that the debtor requested credit counseling services from an approved non-
profit budget and credit counseling agency, but was unable to obtain the services re-
ferred to in paragraph (1) during the 5-day period beginning on the date on which the
debtor made that request; and
(iii) is satisfactory to the court.
(B) With respect to a debtor, an exemption under subparagraph (A) shall cease to
apply to that debtor on the date on which the debtor meets the requirements of para-
graph (1), but in no case may the exemption apply to that debtor after the date that is
30 days after the debtor files a petition, except that the court, for cause, may order an
additional 15 days.
(4) The requirements of paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to a debtor whom
the court determines, after notice and hearing, is unable to complete those require-
ments because of incapacity, disability, or active military duty in a military combat
zone. For the purposes of this paragraph, incapacity means that the debtor is impaired
by reason of mental illness or mental deficiency so that he is incapable of realizing and
making rational decisions with respect to his financial responsibilities; and 'disability'
means that the debtor is so physically impaired as to be unable, after reasonable effort,
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chapter of the Code. Effective for all bankruptcy cases filed after Oc-
tober 17, 2005, § 109(h) provides that to be a debtor, an individual
must obtain a "briefing" from an approved nonprofit budget and
credit counseling agency during the 180-day period before filing bank-
ruptcy. 18 Further, § 109 sets out which agencies are eligible and what,
in general terms, the briefing should entail. 19 A debtor has a duty to
file "a certificate from the approved nonprofit budget and credit coun-
seling agency that provided the debtor services under § 109(h)
describing the services provided to the debtor," as well as any resul-
tant debt repayment plan.20 To be excused from this filing require-
ment, a debtor must demonstrate that he or she meets one of the
three previously discussed exceptions to the rule: § 109(h)(2),
109(h)(3), or 109(h)(4). 21 Section 109(h)(3) requires a debtor to file a
certification demonstrating he or she is entitled to the exception. 22
Pursuant to Interim Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1007(c),
this certification should be filed with the petition.23 There is some dis-
agreement as to whether the timing of the filing of the certificate of
credit counseling24 or the certification seeking an exception from the
same should be strictly construed based upon the requirements of In-
terim Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1007(c). 25 However,
to participate in an in person, telephone, or Internet briefing required under paragraph
(1).
§ 109(h)(3).
18. § 109(h)(1).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 521(b). Section 521(b) is a new subsection under the BAPCPA amendments, which
provides in pertinent part:
(b) In addition to the requirements under subsection (a), a debtor who is an individual
shall file with the court-
(1) a certificate from the approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency
that provided the debtor services under section 109(h) describing the services provided
to the debtor; and
(2) a copy of the debt repayment plan, if any, developed under section 109(h)
through the approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency referred to in par-
agraph (1).
Id.
21. Id. § 109(h)(1).
22. § 109(h)(3).
23. INTERIM FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(c), in ADVISORY COMM. ON BANKR. RULES, 109TH
CoNG., REPORT ON BANKR. RULES 3 (2006).
24. In re Warren, 339 B.R. 475, 479 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006) (holding that absence of credit
counseling certificate at the time of filing is a matter of "form not substance," citing Federal Rule
of Bankruptcy Procedure 5005, which prohibits a clerk from refusing to accept for filing docu-
ments that are not presented in the proper form).
25. In re Bass, No. 06-21011-L, 2006 WL 1593978, at * 3 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. June 9, 2006)
(indicating that although Interim Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c) provides for the filing of the certifica-
tion with the petition, there is nothing in the Bankruptcy Code that sets a deadline for such filing
and that Interim Rule 1007(a)(5) provides the court with the power to extend such filing dead-
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these issues will be resolved with the adoption of the proposed
amendment to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1007.26 The
proposed rule provides both documents should be filed with the peti-
tion.27 Issues also exist as to the timing of the receipt of the counseling
itself. For example, an individual's case can be dismissed if the individ-
ual obtained the credit counseling outside of the 180-day window 28 or
received the credit counseling on the same date that the petition was
filed.29
lines under certain circumstances), rev'd sub nom. Clippard v. Bass, 365 B.R. 131 (W.D. Tenn.
2007); In re Morales, No. 806-70854-478, 2006 WL 2050555, at *5-6 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. May 24,
2006) (holding that although Interim Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c) provides for the filing of the
certification at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, Interim Bankruptcy Rule
9006(b)(1) allows a court to enlarge the time to act on a motion made after the expiration of the
specified time if the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect and further noting that
counsel's failure involved a procedural requirement, not a substantive requirement).
26. For the text of the proposed amended rule, see Letter from Honorable Thomas S. Zilly,
Chair, Advisory Comm. on Bankr. Rules, to Honorable David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm.
on Rules of Practice & Procedure (May 24, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
Excerpt_ BKReport Pub.pdf.
27. Id. (further providing that if a debtor files a statement that he or she has received the
counseling but does not have the certificate, the certificate can be filed within fifteen days after
the order for relief).
28. In re Moon, No 06-40607, 2007 WL 1087452 (Bankr. D. Idaho Apr. 5, 2007) (dismissing
case when credit counseling received 271 days before the petition date); In re Ruckdaschel, 364
B.R. 724 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007) (dismissing case when credit counseling received 187 days
before the petition date); In re Gaikoski, No. 07-60444,2007 WL 845876 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar.
16, 2007) (dismissing case when credit counseling received more than 180 days before the peti-
tion date); In re Giles, 361 B.R. 212 (Bankr. D. Utah 2007) (dismissing case when credit counsel-
ing received 182 days before the petition date); In re Jones, 352 B.R. 813 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006)
(dismissing case when credit counseling received more than 180 days before the petition date);
In re King, No. 06-41046, 2006 WL 1994679, at *3 n.1 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. June 21, 2006) (noting
case could be dismissed when debtors obtained pre-petition counseling 181 days before the peti-
tion date). But see In re Bricksin, 346 B.R. 497 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006). The Bricksin court held
dismissal was inappropriate even though debtors obtained the credit counseling outside of the
180-day window because the debtors' "completion of credit counseling, and then ongoing per-
formance under the debt repayment plan within the 180-day period prior to filing, fulfill[ed] the
spirit of the statutory requirement." Id. at 502.
29. In re Cole, 347 B.R. 70 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006). The court noted the requirement that
counseling be obtained at least one day prior to the filing date comported with the congressional
purpose of allowing individuals to be educated about bankruptcy in advance of filing, stating
"[t]his purpose would be thwarted by allowing a debtor to obtain a pre-petition counseling brief-
ing on the same day that a bankruptcy petition is filed." Id. at 77. This statement beckons the
question of how congressional purpose is furthered by allowing for the "temporary exemption"
in 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)(B). See also In re Mills, 341 B.R. 106, 109 (Bankr. D. D.C. 2006); In re
Murphy, 342 B.R. 671, 673 (Bankr. D. D.C. 2006) (noting debtor "inadvertently" complied with
§ 109(h) because she received credit counseling one day before petition date, noting that "when
a statute requires an act to be done within a specified number of days prior to a fixed date, the
last day, namely, the fixed date, is to be excluded . . . in making the calculation" (citations
omitted)). But see In re Swanson, No. 06-00968-TLM, 2006 WL 3782906 (Bankr. D. Idaho Dec.
21, 2006); In re Moore, 359 B.R. 665 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006) (noting the interpretation not
requiring a one-day waiting period is practical in light of the electronic age of the Internet and
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As stated previously, an individual can avoid the pre-petition credit
counseling requirement under one of three specific exceptions found
in § 109(h)(2), (3), and (4). First, under § 109(h)(2), the pre-petition
credit counseling requirement does not apply to those individuals who
reside in a district where the United States trustee has determined
that "the approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agencies
for such district are not reasonably able to provide adequate services
to the additional individuals who would otherwise seek credit counsel-
ing from such agencies" as imposed by § 109(h)(1). 30 Second,
§ 109(h)(3)(A) provides the pre-petition credit counseling require-
ment "shall not apply" to a debtor who submits a certification, which:
(1) describes exigent circumstances that merit a waiver; (2) states that
the debtor requested such services from an approved agency, but was
unable to obtain such services during the five day period beginning on
the date that the debtor made the request; and (3) is satisfactory to
the court.31 This Subsection has a further qualification, which states
that the "exemption" provided for in § 109(h)(3)(A) "shall cease to
apply" thirty days after filing or an additional fifteen days for cause
shown.32 Third, § 109(h)(4) provides that the pre-petition credit coun-
seling requirement "shall not apply with respect to a debtor whom the
court determines, after notice and hearing, is unable to complete
those requirements because of incapacity, disability, or active military
duty in a military combat zone."'33
Although § 109(h)(1) uses the same prefacing language of "shall
not apply," each of the three subsections, § 109(h)(2), (3), and (4),
provide for different levels of "exemption." Whether the three excep-
tions are waivers, exemptions, or deferrals is unclear because Con-
electronic bankruptcy filings); First Shore Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudson (In re Hudson), 352
B.R. 391 (Bankr. D. Md. 2006); In re Spears, 355 B.R. 116, 119 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006) ("Ad-
ding an additional one-day waiting period is not necessary to make the process more arduous.
Nor does adding a one-day waiting period assist in convincing debtors not to file for bank-
ruptcy.... Finally, adding a one day waiting period does nothing to educate debtors about the
alternatives available to them."); In re Warren, 339 B.R. 475, 480 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006) (hold-
ing that credit counseling received on same date as petition date, specifically four hours before
petition was filed, satisfied § 109(h)(1) based upon interpretation of the phrase "date of filing"
to include the specific day, month, year, and time of day the petition was filed).
This timing issue also arises in regards to when a request for such counseling is made. The
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut used the reasoning from In re
Warren to determine whether a request for counseling satisfied § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii) if the debtor
made the request on the same date as the petition filing date. In re Toccaline, No. 06-20218, 2006
WL 2081517 (Bankr. D. Conn. July 17, 2006).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(2) (2006).
31. § 109(h)(3)(A).
32. § 109(h)(3)(B).
33. § 109(h)(4).
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gress mislabeled the carve-outs or failed to label them at all; none of
the foregoing terms are defined by the Code.34 Black's Law Diction-
ary defines "defer" as "[t]o postpone; to delay. ' 35 "Waiver" is defined
as "[t]he voluntary relinquishment or abandonment-express or im-
plied-of a legal right or advantage. '36 "Exemption" is defined as
"[f]reedom from a duty, liability, or other requirement; an excep-
tion. ' 37 Common usage incorrectly equates waiver with relinquish-
ment of a right or an obligation. The distinction is that waiver is a
relinquishment of a right or entitlement, whereas an exemption is the
release from an obligation. The terms "waiver" and "exemption" in
proper usage should refer to the object. If the object is a known right,
then the appropriate word is "waive." For example, the client waived
his right to counsel. However, if the object is an obligation, the appro-
priate word is "exempt." For example, the debtor was exempt (or ex-
cused) from paying the filing fees. Therefore, with regards to § 109(h),
courts "waive" the right to require the counseling, thereby conferring
an exemption. Importantly, the wording is not merely a distinction
without a difference but holds varying results whichever is implied.
Neither § 109(h)(2) nor § 109(h)(4) use any label for the carve-out.
However, using the analysis above, § 109(h)(2) provides for an ex-
emption because in districts where the United States trustee has de-
termined that agencies are not available, an individual is automatically
excluded/exempted from the pre-petition credit counseling require-
ment.38 However, because the United States Trustee Program has set
34. See generally id. § 101.
35. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 454 (8th ed. 2004). See In re Cleaver, 333 B.R. 430, 434 n.5
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005) (noting the United States Supreme Court's use of dictionaries to deter-
mine the common meaning of words that are not defined in the Code) (citations omitted).
36. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1611 (8th ed. 2004).
37. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 612 (8th ed. 2004).
38. This exemption is further limited in § 109(h)(2)(B), which requires a review of a determi-
nation made under Subsection 109(h)(2)(A) within one year. This provision seems to eradicate
the exemption, if one ever existed. However, on September 21, 2006, the United States Trustee
Program conferred an exemption from the credit counseling requirement and the debtor educa-
tion requirement to individuals in areas affected by Hurricane Katrina, specifically the Eastern,
Middle, and Western Districts of Louisiana and the Southern District of Mississippi. See Press
Release, U.S. Tr. Program/Dep't of Justice, U.S. Trustee Program Extends Waiver of Credit
Counseling and Debtor Education Requirements in Areas Affected by Hurricane Katrina (Sept.
21, 2006), available at http:/www.usdoj.gov/ustleo/public-affairs/press/docs/pr20060921.htm. The
United States Trustee Program withdrew this exemption for the Middle and Western District of
Louisiana and the Southern District of Mississippi effective March 10, 2008. U.S. Tr. Program/
Dep't of Justice, Credit Counseling & Debtor Education Information, http://www.usdoj.gov/ustl
eo/bapcpa/ccde/index.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
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forth an approved list for every district in the United States, 39 it is
unlikely that this Section will allow many, if any, individuals to escape
the pre-petition credit counseling requirement.
Arguably, § 109(h)(4) provides for an exemption as well, even
though an individual's entitlement to an exemption is not automatic.
An exemption is based upon a specific showing following notice and a
hearing on the issue.40 Although this Section specifically states the
credit counseling requirement does not apply to those individuals who
fall under the definitions of § 109(h)(4), there is a quagmire inherent
in the language of this Section because § 109(h)(1) specifically pro-
vides a carve-out for those individuals who meet the definitions of
§ 109(h)(2) and (3), but not § 109(h)(4).41 The exclusion of
§ 109(h)(4) appears to be a legislative oversight because there would
be no logical reason to exclude it, and this language provides yet an-
other example of poor legislative drafting.
Unlike § 109(h)(2) and (4), § 109(h)(3) uses the terms "waiver" and
"exemption" interchangeably, when neither term is appropriate. First,
in § 109(h)(3)(A)(i), the language requires a showing that the exigent
circumstances "merit a waiver."' 42 Then, twice in § 109(h)(3)(B) it
states that there is "an exemption" under subparagraph (A).43 Argua-
bly, the reference to "waiver" in § 109(h)(3)(A)(i) can be equated to
the court's "waiver" of its known legal right to require the pre-petition
credit counseling. The more problematic language is the reference to
an "exemption" in § 109(h)(3)(B) because the individual who meets
the three-part test under § 109(h)(3)(A) is not entitled to an exemp-
tion in the true sense of the word but is still required to obtain the
briefing post-petition. Therefore, there is not a waiver by the court or
an exemption to the individual, but in reality, there is a deferral or a
temporary exemption made upon the individual's satisfactory showing
under § 109(h)(3)(A). 44 One court has even questioned whether the
39. For a complete list of the approved credit counseling agencies, see U.S. Tr. Program/Dep't
of Justice, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, http://www.us
doj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/ccde/cc-approved.htm (last visited March 2, 2008).
40. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(4) (2006).
41. § 109(h)(1) ("Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3). ). See Dixon v. LaBarge (In re
Dixon), 338 B.R. 383, 386 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006) (noting the "Gordian Knot" this situation
presents in that "the language of § 109(h)(1) and (4) seem to preempt each other's
applicability").
42. § 109(h)(3)(A)(i).
43. § 109(h)(3)(B).
44. See, e.g., In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. 486, 495-96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (providing analysis
of the "tortured construction" of § 109(h)(3) and concluding that it provides for an "extension");
In re Thompson, 344 B.R. 899, 902 n.6 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2006) (finding § 109(h)(3) provides for a
"deferral"); In re Wilson, 346 B.R. 59, 60 n.1 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y 2006) (finding § 109(h)(3)(B)
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counseling is required at all, noting that the "shall not apply" language
in § 109(h)(3)(A) "appears to indicate that if the three part test found
in that section is met, the debtor need not seek credit counseling at
all."4
5
Having determined that both § 109(h)(2) and § 109(h)(4) provide
for complete exemptions from the pre-petition credit counseling re-
quirement and § 109(h)(3) provides merely for a temporary exemp-
tion, deferral, or an extension, one questions why Congress chose to
provide the exemption to one subset of debtors and not another. Ad-
ditionally, it is unclear whether this temporary deferral for only one
subset of debtors furthers Congress's goal of pre-petition education
and financial literacy.
III. DOES § 109(H)(3) FURTHER A
DEFINED LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE?
Rooted in the 1997 Recommendations from the National Bank-
ruptcy Review Commission and echoed in the Congressional debates
over BAPCPA, Congress's goal was clear: heighten financial literacy
in order to reduce bankruptcy filings.46 However, that goal is not be-
ing met by the pre-petition credit counseling requirement that Con-
gress enacted. First, the "temporal deferral" of the pre-petition credit
counseling requirement found in § 109(h)(3)(B), allowing for the
counseling to be held post-petition, does not aid in steering individuals
away from bankruptcy. Second, what limited data does exist suggests
that individuals obtaining the counseling pre-petition are still turning
to bankruptcy as their only recourse.
The goal of financial literacy has a long history of unrealized poten-
tial. Notably, in 1997, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
("Commission"), which laid the groundwork for many of the
BAPCPA Amendments, recommended "[a]ll debtors in both Chapter
7 and in Chapter 13 should have the opportunity to participate in a
provides for an "'extension' of time"); In re Cleaver, 333 B.R. 430, 434 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005)
(referring to § 109(h)(3) as a "temporary exemption"); Dixon, 338 B.R. at 388 (finding
§ 109(h)(3)(B) provides for a "deferral"); In re Rodriguez, 336 B.R. 462, 469 n.14 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 2005) (utilizing the term "exemption," noting § 109(h)(3)(B) sets forth the duration of the
exemption and further noting "[l]ike much of BAPCPA, it is hard to tell whether terminology is
used with active intention or sloppy inattention").
45. Elmendorf, 345 B.R. at 495 (emphasis in original). The court analyzed the other inconsis-
tencies in the language of § 109(h)(3) and concluded that "[w]ere a debtor to misconstrue this
section and believe they [sic] had no obligation to obtain a certificate, it would be inequitable for
a court to dismiss a case for 'cause' when a debtor has understandably misinterpreted a poorly
drafted statute." Id. at 496.
46. See infra note 47.
274 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
financial education program. '47 However, this Recommendation fo-
cused more on post-petition counseling, albeit recognizing the
"emerging consensus for the need" for pre-petition counseling.48 The
Commission noted there should be support for "financial education
programs that might avert financial crises in the first place .... Im-
proving individuals' knowledge of financial matters and money man-
agement can and should be encouraged on several fronts. '49
Specifically addressing the post-petition education programs, the Rec-
ommendation did not focus on mandatory programs, but on "volun-
tary" programs, stating that "[m]andatory programs may be unduly
coercive and difficult to administer. Mandatory education might also
impose a hardship on a debtor whose job interferes with the class
schedule, or who lives in a rural area. '50
In addition to the recommendations in 1997, the legislative history
on the pre-petition credit counseling requirement of BAPCPA pro-
vides insight into the overarching purpose and goals intended by the
requirement; however, it provides little insight into the specific lan-
guage adopted by Congress. The main goals, echoed through many of
the legislators' comments, were financial literacy and exploration of
alternatives to bankruptcy in order to avoid having bankruptcy as
one's only answer. Succinctly stated and repeated by courts addressing
the issue, "[BAPCPA] requires debtors to receive credit counseling
before they can be eligible for bankruptcy relief so that they will make
an informed choice about bankruptcy, its alternatives, and conse-
quences. "51 Congress has indicated financial education is a fundamen-
tal goal, expressing the "'Sense of the Congress' that personal finance
47. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY
REVIEW COMMISSION, Recommendation 1.1.5, Financial Education, at 114 (1997) [hereinafter
COMMISSION REPORT]. Notably, individuals filing Chapter 11 were excluded from the Recom-
mendation. However, under § 109(h)(1), this oversight was remedied by requiring each "individ-
ual" to receive the pre-petition credit counseling. § 109(h)(1). The constitutionality of requiring
individuals filing Chapter 11 to obtain pre-petition credit counseling has been upheld. Hedquist
v. Fokkena (In re Hedquist), 342 B.R. 295, 298 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006); In re Watson, 332 B.R.
740, 747 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005); In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145, 157 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006).
48. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 47, at 114.
49. Id. at 116.
50. Id. The Commission also noted "[violuntary programs are the preferable course of action
until various types of postbankruptcy education programs can be evaluated." Id. This comment
foreshadows some of the very problems associated with the § 109(h)(1) requirements, problems
of implementing a new mandatory program without its prior testing in a pilot program.
51. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89. For cases
using this quote see, e.g., In re Moore, 359 B.R. 665, 673 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006); In re Thomp-
son, 344 B.R. 899, 902 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2006); In re Carey, 341 B.R. 798, 802 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2006); In re Salazar, 339 B.R. 622, 630 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006); In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145, 152
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006); In re Rios, 336 B.R. 177, 179-180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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curricula be developed for elementary and secondary education pro-
grams. If we teach our children, early-on, how to manage money,
credit, and debt, they can become responsible workers, and heads of
households and keep their parents out of bankruptcy court. '5 2
As noted previously, the laudatory goal of financial literacy is not at
issue, but the means of implementing it is. If one is not open to an
idea, the effort required to reach that individual is extraordinary, if
not insurmountable. Attempting to teach a person about finances and
creating a budget when the individual is facing imminent creditor col-
lection activity is futile. However, the period post-petition or "pre-
discharge" is a teachable moment when an individual can learn from
his or her past mistakes, so as not to repeat them in the future. Al-
though the pre-petition credit counseling provisions were meant to
"help people avoid the cycle of indebtedness, ' 53 this purpose could be
fulfilled by a post-petition financial management course, and would
not be of service to an individual five days before an imminent credi-
tor collection activity; nor would the purpose be fulfilled within the
thirty to forty-five days post-petition should an individual obtain the
"temporary exemption" or "deferral" in § 109(h)(3)(B). Therefore,
the primary goal of educating individuals about the alternatives to
bankruptcy and ways to avoid having bankruptcy as one's only option,
is not being met by the "temporary deferral" of such counseling.
Furthermore, statistics indicate that even for those individuals who
do receive the counseling pre-petition, this counseling is seen merely
as a hurdle to the filing of the petition and not as an educational tool.
In realistic estimation, it was envisioned the pre-petition credit coun-
seling requirement might avert only a mere five to ten percent of
bankruptcy filings.5 4 Actual data gathered subsequent to the enact-
ment of BAPCPA indicated the percentages were closer to two to
three percent.5 5 Therefore, the second goal of educating individuals
pre-petition in order to reduce the numbers of bankruptcy filings has
not been met.
52. 151 CONG. REC. H2063-01, 2070 (2005).
53. 151 CONG. REc. S1726-01, 1786 (2005).
54. 151 CONG. REc. S2053-08, 2054 (2005).
55. Out of 66,335 consumers surveyed by the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy
Attorneys, a "paltry" 3.3 percent of individuals who received the credit counseling qualified for
alternative, non-bankruptcy, debt management treatment. In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. 486, 490
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). See also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BANKRUPTCY REFORM:
VALUE OF CREDIT COUNSELING REQUIREMENT is NOT CLEAR 22 (2007) (noting averages vary
between two to three percent of individuals who enter debt management plans following a credit
counseling session).
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Because it was a new provision, the credit counseling requirement
was sure to encounter unforeseen problems; however, Congress did
not impose a monitoring obligation upon the United States Trustee
Program like it did for the pilot financial management course. 56 The
United States Government Accountability Office issued a report in
April of 2007 recommending the United States Trustee Program, al-
though not statutorily required to do so, track and monitor the results
of the pre-petition counseling sessions because "such data would be
useful in determining whether the counseling requirement is meeting
its intended goal."' 57 Congress has an obligation to assess certain pro-
visions and their effectiveness and to revise them upon consideration.
Congress should do that very thing: review the nascent history of
§ 109 and its tortured path through the court system and revise the
provisions by providing "honest but unfortunate debtors" with a fresh
start.
IV. CRITICISM BY THE COURTS AND COMMENTATORS
Faced with the new amendments, courts and commentators have
been less than supportive of the pre-petition credit counseling require-
ment and, in many instances, highly critical of the new requirement.
Issues, such as purpose, utility, costs, and ethics, arise. With regard to
the overall purpose, one court has opined "[i]t was apparently an
agenda to make more money off the backs of the consumers in this
country .... [T]o call the Act[ ] a 'consumer protection' Act is the
grossest of misnomers." 58 Another court has stated:
This facially well-intentioned section of the BAPCPA has evolved
into an expensive, draconian gate-keeping requirement that has pre-
vented many deserving individuals from qualifying for bankruptcy
relief. The credit counseling requirement has not proven to be of
assistance to debtors in seeking relief outside of the bankruptcy con-
text .... 59
Issues as to the utility of the requirement also arise. 60 One court has
described the pre-petition credit counseling requirement as "the most
outrageous fleecing of consumer debtors in this Court's memory-a
56. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
57. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BANKRUPTCY REFORM: VALUE OF CREDIT COUN-
SELING REQUIREMENT IS NOT CLEAR 19 (2007).
58. In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113, 114 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005) (calling the pre-petition credit
counseling requirement "inane").
59. Elmendorf, 345 B.R. at 490.
60. However, the issue of utility cannot be left to the individual filing for relief to decide. See
In re Monteiro, No. 05-85018, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 2695, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 31, 2005)
(holding debtor's opinion that the credit counseling would be of no utility to her because she had
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perfunctory exercise with little or no substance which leaves a puta-
tive debtor $50-$100 the poorer."' 61 In its 2007 Report, the United
States Government Accountability Office specifically focused on the
value of the pre-petition credit counseling requirement, finding in its
research that "it is unclear whether the credit counseling requirement
is achieving its intended purpose. '62 Its research indicated "the timing
of the counseling conducted to fulfill the requirement of the Bank-
ruptcy Act could mitigate its value" and the requirement was seen as
"an administrative obstacle rather than a useful exercise. ' 63 A specific
issue of utility is what is actually involved or to be accomplished in the
"briefing." For example, it has been posited that debtors could be
"'misled about their opportunities for relief under the Code"' because
the related budget analysis performed during the credit counseling
could use different criteria than those criteria used under a means test
analysis. 64
Furthermore, cost issues arise. The Code provides "if a fee is
charged for counseling services, [nonprofit budget and credit counsel-
ing agencies shall] charge a reasonable fee, and provide services with-
out regard to ability to pay the fee."' 65 However, what is defined as a
"reasonable fee," and does this provide a requirement for the credit
counseling agency to provide services without payment? 66 In its Re-
not had success with credit counselors in the past and because her case was too complicated did
not excuse her from the pre-petition credit counseling requirement).
61. In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. 486, 490 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). See also In re Wilson, 346 B.R.
59, 62 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2006):
Few sections of the newly enacted BAPCPA have been as uniformly misunderstood as
§ 109(h)(3)(A), perhaps because the whole concept of compelling an individual already
buried in a financial morass to undergo credit counseling during the 180 day period pre-
filing, as a condition precedent to actually filing a petition, makes about as much sense
as requiring spouses locked in a bitter divorce proceeding to attend a marriage counsel-
ing seminar before a judge can sign a decree dissolving their marriage. In both cases, it
is generally too late for either type of counseling to produce a beneficial result.
Id.
62. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BANKRUPTCY REFORM: VALUE OF CREDIT COUN-
SELING REQUIREMENT IS NOT CLEAR 23 (2007).
63. Id. at 23-24.
64. Leslie E. Linfield, Strange Bedfellows: Bankruptcy Reform and Mandatory Credit Counsel-
ing, 24 Am. BANKR. INST. J. 12, 12 (2005) (citing Gordon Bermant & Ed Flynn, Planning for
Change: Credit Counseling at the Threshold of Bankruptcy, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1 (2001)).
This confusion is because credit counseling agencies may not be using the IRS expense guide-
lines, which are used in a means test analysis. Id. The majority of debtors fair better under
Chapter 13 plans than under debt management plans; therefore, a debtor's better choice is still
bankruptcy. Id.
65. 11 U.S.C. § 111(c)(2)(B) (2006).
66. See Linfield, supra note 64 ("Some NFCC member agencies charge or request a contribu-
tion for counseling (the average amount is $15)." (quoting statement from Susan Keating, Presi-
dent and CEO of the National Foundation for Credit Counseling (NFCC))). But see In re
278 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
port, the United States Government Accountability Office concluded
that while the fees charged by credit counseling agencies were gener-
ally considered reasonable, averaging fifty dollars per session, the fee
waiver polices of the agencies varied greatly. 67 Due to the lack of clear
guidelines from the United States Trustee Program and the evidence
of varying practices of credit counseling agencies with regard to fee
waivers, the Report included a specific recommendation that the
United States Trustee Program issue "formal guidance on what consti-
tutes 'ability to pay."' 68  To date, no guidelines have been
promulgated.
Additionally, ethical concerns focus on both debtors' counsel and
the credit counseling agencies themselves. First, there is the potential
issue of competition between credit counseling agencies and debtors'
counsel, where both seek to provide services to the same client. 69 Sec-
ond, the issue of referral fees to attorneys raises ethical issues like
practicing with non-lawyers, fee sharing, and attorney-run credit coun-
seling agencies. 70 Third, the creditability of the credit counseling agen-
cies also arises. The Chair of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, Norm Coleman, stated:
Over the past several years, the credit counseling industry has seen
the emergence of new and aggressive credit counseling agencies....
The practices of these new agencies resulted in consumer com-
plaints of excessive fees, pressure tactics, nonexistent counseling
and education, promised results that never came about, ruined
credit ratings, poor service and in many cases being left in worse
debt than before they initiated their debt-management plan. 71
Regardless of the negative public opinion of the pre-petition credit
counseling requirement, some believe the "briefing" mandated by
§ 109(h) may be beneficial in the form of: (1) a non-bankruptcy debt
Westenberger, No. 0610477-BKC-RBR, 2006 WL 1105008 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2006)
(credit counseling agency was not willing to provide counseling until debtor's out of town check
cleared its bank account); see also infra note 155 and accompanying text, discussing cases where
credit counseling agencies refused to waive fees.
67. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BANKRUPTCY REFORM: VALUE OF CREDIT COUN-
SELING REQUIREMENT IS NOT CLEAR 30 (2007).
68. Id. at 41.
69. Linfield, supra note 64 (noting that the credit counseling agency and the consumer bank-
ruptcy attorney offer different alternatives to the same potential client, either a debt repayment
plan or a bankruptcy case respectively).
70. Id.
71. Legislative Highlight, Senate Committee Urges More Cleanup of Credit Counseling, 24 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 3 (2005). See also In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. 486, 490 n.3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(noting concern over actions of credit counseling agencies, stating: "Perhaps Congress should
have taken a closer look at this industry before placing it between a debtor and the succor of the
federal bankruptcy court.") (emphasis in the original).
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management plan [DMP] based upon the means test showing a
mandatory Chapter 13 filing, which will keep individuals out of bank-
ruptcy; (2) a deterrent to unsecured creditors to force bankruptcy and
an incentive to unsecured creditors to comply with a DMP under 11
U.S.C. § 502(k)(1); (3) coordinated efforts by credit counseling agen-
cies through HUD-approved housing counseling agencies and lender
loss mitigation departments in cases involving foreclosures; and (4) an
escape from economic costs of filing fees, etc. associated with
BAPCPA.72 However, a more in-depth analysis of some of these al-
leged benefits demonstrates that they represent a simplified view of
the process.
First, as stated previously, credit counseling agencies may not use
the same IRS guidelines as used in a means test analysis. Second, re-
gardless of an individual's ability to avoid any stigma attached to a
bankruptcy filing, many seek bankruptcy relief for the protection of
the automatic stay, which would not be realized outside of the bank-
ruptcy arena. Last, there continues to be economic costs associated
with non-bankruptcy alternatives, including the counseling fee, moni-
toring fee, and other costs, such as if the DMP fails and the debtor
must file bankruptcy.
Regardless of the position taken, the courts are faced with imple-
menting this new Code provision. If the courts are to give any sub-
stance to the language of the provision, there needs to be a consensus
on the meaning of the terms. By giving substance to the language and
concrete guidelines for individuals prepared to file, a real standard can
be set. A concrete standard, like those provisions of § 109(h)(2) and
(4), should result in a true exemption instead of a temporary exemp-
tion or deferral.
V. INCONSISTENT APPLICATION BY THE COURTS
Since its effective date, BAPCPA has presented the courts with
many issues of first impression, including the exception to the pre-
petition credit counseling requirement in § 109(h)(3). Courts have
employed several different interpretations as to the form of the certifi-
cation under § 109(h)(3)(A), the definition of "exigent circum-
stances," the requirements of § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii), and the definition of
"satisfactory to the court. '73 These conflicting interpretations demon-
72. Gregory P. Johnson, What is a Briefing, and Will It Reduce Filings? 24 AM. BANKR. INST.
J. 10 (2005).
73. These issues are the main focus of differing interpretations addressed in this Article but by
no means demonstrate an exhaustive list. Although outside the scope of this Article, a major
source of debate centers around the ultimate effect of an individual's failure to comply with the
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strate a need to revise this confusing section. Once the ambiguities are
addressed and guidelines set forth, the meeting of the statutory ele-
ments of § 109(h)(3)(A) should result in a complete exemption, simi-
lar to its counterpart in § 109(h)(4), wherein additional guidelines
exist in the Section itself to provide guidance to courts interpreting the
words of § 109(h)(4). 74 This next Section attempts to propose an out-
line of what should suffice under § 109(h)(3)(A) to obtain the
exemption.
A. Debate over the Form of Certification Under § 109(h)(3) (A)
One of the initial hurdles under the pre-petition credit counseling
requirement is the mere formatting of the certification requesting an
exception under § 109(h)(3)(A). 75 Several courts have adopted the
standard enunciated in In re Hubbard in determining what is to be
included in a certification under § 109(h)(3)(A); it requires a showing
of "the facts underlying any alleged exigent circumstances, the date(s)
on which the debtor requested credit counseling, which agencies were
contacted to render the services, why the debtor believes that the ser-
vices could not be obtained before the filing, and when the services
credit counseling requirement. Notably, the statute is silent as to the effect of a filing of a peti-
tion by an individual who is ineligible under § 109(h), thereby leaving that decision to the courts,
a "Hobson's choice," at best, between dismissal of the case or striking the petition. Elmendorf,
345 B.R. at 501 n.21. For a thorough analysis of this issue, see Joseph Satorius, Strike or Dismiss:
Interpretation of the BAPCPA 109(h) Credit Counseling Requirement, 75 FORDHAM L. Rav. 2231
(2007). An additional twist to this controversy results in debtors seeking to use their failure to
comply with the mandatory pre-petition credit counseling requirement as a method by which to
dismiss their own cases. See Mendez v. Salven (In re Mendez), 367 B.R. 109 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2007); In re Parker, 351 B.R. 790 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006). In order to circumvent the situation
where a debtor could utilize the Bankruptcy Code for improper purposes, these courts have held
the debtors waived strict compliance with the pre-petition credit counseling requirement. Men-
dez, 367 B.R. at 118; Parker, 351 B.R. at 799.
74. See infra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
75. In addition to the diverging views on the form of the certification, courts have also ad-
dressed the appropriate nomenclature of the document itself. In In re Wallert, the court found
the debtor's attorney incorrectly entitled the document submitted under § 109(h)(3)(A) a certifi-
cate. 332 B.R. 884, 887 n.3 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005). The court held this label was incorrect be-
cause § 109(h)(3)(A) specifically states a debtor's request for an exemption was to be made by
"certification." Id. (emphasis in original). The court found the statement from a credit counseling
agency, demonstrating the completion of such briefing, was a certificate. Id. The court noted
"[tihere [wa]s no apparent basis for the distinction in nomenclature on the fact of the Act. None-
theless, if anything [wa]s to be gleaned from the facial complexity of so many of the Act's provi-
sions, it is that the very devil is in the details." Id. See also In re Rodriguez, 336 B.R. 462, 470
n.18 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2005). The Rodriguez court found the title of the document, a "Request
for Waiver of Timely Filing of Title 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) Credit Certificate," was of "limited signif-
icance" if the document followed the certification requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Id. at 464,
470 n.18. The court also noted Congress used titles such as certification, declaration, and affida-
vit interchangeably, advising against "exalt[ing] form over substance." Id. at 470 n.18 (citations
omitted).
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are reasonably likely to be obtained. ' 76 Although courts have been
generally able to agree on this standard, there are divergent views on
the format of the certification. 77 Some courts have required that the
certification under § 109(h)(3)(A) be made under penalty of per-
jury,78 whereas others impose less exacting requirements. 79 Unfortu-
nately, the differing interpretations will only be multiplied by the
amended Official Voluntary Petition Form, adopted in October of
2006.
The courts requiring the certification be made under penalty of per-
jury base their conclusion on the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1746.80
76. In re Hubbard, 332 B.R. 285, 289 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). As to the form of the certifica-
tion, the court found an unverified motion did not suffice and, without a proper certification, the
motion was "fatally defective." Id. For cases citing the Hubbard standard, see, e.g., In re
Mingueta, 338 B.R. 833, 838 n.9 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006); In re Rodriguez, 336 B.R. at 472 n.22;
In re Cleaver, 333 B.R. 430, 434-35 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005); In re Talib, 335 B.R. 417, 421
(Bankr. D. Mo. 2005). Additional standards provide that in a certification, a debtor should:
[F]orthrightly address the extent of his or her knowledge of the credit counseling re-
quirement; the contacts if any with lawyers, petition preparers or other providing ad-
vice, and whether such advice included information regarding the credit counseling
requirement; and the nature and timing of the event(s) that create the exigency for
filing.
Rodriguez, 336 B.R. at 475.
77. However, it is clear Official Bankruptcy Form 23, 11 U.S.C. (Oct. 2006), entitled
"Debtor's Certification of Completion of Instructional Course Concerning Personal Financial
Management," which is the form used to request an exemption from the personal financial man-
agement course, cannot be deemed a request or "certification" under § 109(h)(3)(A). See In re
Swiatkowski, 356 B.R. 581, 584 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006).
78. See, e.g., Mingueta, 338 B.R. at 837; In re Dansby, 340 B.R. 564, 567 (Bankr. D. S.C. 2006);
Rodriguez, 336 B.R. at 470; Wallert, 332 B.R. at 887 n.3; In re LaPorta, 332 B.R. 879, 881 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 2005); Hubbard, 333 B.R. at 376.
79. See, e.g., In re Graham, 336 B.R. 292, 296 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2005). The court noted:
The failure of Congress to require expressly that a debtor adhere to 28 U.S.C. § 1746
when filing his or her motion under § 109(h)(3)(A) prevents this Court from imposing
such stringent requirements upon a debtor. Instead, this Court finds that "certification"
simply means that a debtor must sign his or her motion requesting such an extension.
Id.; Cleaver, 333 B.R. at 434.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (2006). Section 1746 provides in pertinent part:
Wherever, under any law of the United States or under any rule, regulation, order,
or requirement made pursuant to law, any matter is required or permitted to be sup-
ported, evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn declaration, verification, certifi-
cate, statement, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the person making the same (other than
a deposition, or an oath of office, or an oath required to be taken before a specified
official other than a notary public), such matter may, with like force and effect, be
supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the unsworn declaration, certificate,
verification, or statement, in writing of such person which is subscribed by him, as true
under penalty of perjury, and dated, in substantially the following form:
(2) If executed within the United States, its territories, possessions, or common-
wealths: "I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the forego-
ing is true and correct. Executed on (date). (Signature)".
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Courts requiring strict compliance with that Section argue that by the
choice of the terminology "certification" in § 109(h)(3)(A), Congress
obviously envisioned more than a mere "garden-variety" motion
signed by the debtor's attorney to suffice. 8' Although these courts re-
quire strict compliance with § 1746, other courts do not always require
form over substance.
Various rationales exist for not imposing the exacting requirements
of § 1746 in a certification. First, § 109(h)(3)(A)'s requirement of a
"certification" is not the exact language used in 28 U.S.C. § 1746.82
Second, the requirement that documents to be signed under penalty of
perjury, found in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1008, does
not specifically include such certifications.83 Third, a synthesis of the
dictionary definitions of "certification," "certify," and "attest" 84 pro-
81. Rodriguez, 336 B.R. at 469. Although the court acknowledged that by signing a motion,
either a debtor or his attorney were "certifying" that the allegations had evidentiary and factual
support under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011, the court found "§ 109(h)(3)(A)
requires more than the implicit certifying effect of Rule 9011." Id. However, the court allowed
the debtors, after a hearing on their attorney's "request" under § 109(h)(3)(A), to remedy the
inadequate submissions due to the matter being one of first impression, noting such leniency
would not be provided in future cases. Id. at 474 n.30. For other cases requiring a certification to
meet the standards of § 1746, see Hubbard, 333 B.R. at 376 (declining "to read the word 'certifi-
cation' to mean merely that a motion is filed that makes certain allegations. Congress obviously
had a meaning that extended beyond the mere filing of a motion. The fact that some of the
motions say that they are certifications does not make them so."). See also Dansby, 340 B.R. at
567. The court focused the bar's attention on the court's suggested forms for certification under
§ 109(h), which contain the oath as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Id. The court found that be-
cause the certification was an "important document," it needed to include the normal certifica-
tion language "required by debtors in other initial filings." Id. However, the court ultimately did
not impose these requirements on those debtors. Id. See also In re Afolabi, 343 B.R. 195, 198 n.2
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2006) (noting that the certification form for § 109(h)(3)(A) on the court's
website contained the oath).
82. See In re Talib, 335 B.R. 417, 420 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005) (noting 28 U.S.C. § 1746 specifi-
cally uses the term "certificate," not certification).
83. Id. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1008 provides "[a]ll petitions, lists, schedules,
statements and amendments thereto shall be verified or contain an unsworn declaration as pro-
vided in 28 U.S.C. § 1746." FED. R. BANKR. P. 1008. The Talib court found additional support for
this position in the proposed Official Bankruptcy Form 23 styled Debtor's Certification of Com-
pletion of Instructional Course Concerning Personal Financial Management, which was also cap-
tioned a "certification," and which was not set up to be signed under penalty of perjury. Talib,
335 B.R. at 420 n.3. The court noted the Interim Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
1007(b)(7) required the filing of this "statement," with regards to the pre-discharge counseling
required under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(11). Id. However, even though such a "statement" should
have be sworn to as required by Rule 1008, the Proposed Official Form 23 did not so require. Id.
84. See In re Cleaver, 333 B.R. 430, 434 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005).The Cleaver court utilized
the following definitions: "[I]n Black's Law Dictionary, a certification is '1. The act of attesting.
2. The state of having been attested. 3. An attested statement."' Id. at 433 (citing BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 220 (7th ed. 1999)). The court found that "attest" was defined as "'1. To bear
witness; testify <attest to the defendant's innocence>. 2. To affirm to be true or genuine; to
authenticate by signing as a witness <attest the will>."' Id. at 434 (citing BLACK's LAw DICTION-
ARY 124 (7th ed. 1999)). The court further found Webster's Third New International Dictionary
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vides a certification is to be "at a minimum, a written statement that
the signer affirms or attests to be true. '8 5 Yet another reason for di-
vergence from the strict requirements of § 1746 is, like any other filing
in a bankruptcy case, the certification has to comply with the require-
ments of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 and would be
presumed by a court to be "truthful, accurate, and made in good
faith."8 6
Although the Official Voluntary Petition Form, adopted subsequent
to the enactment of BAPCPA, could have addressed and clarified
some of the ambiguities with the formatting of the certification, the
revised Voluntary Petition Form only appears to complicate the issue.
Prior to its amendment in October of 2006, the Official Form required
a debtor to choose between two options: a completion of a credit
counseling course or a waiver based upon exigent circumstances, with
an attached certification explaining.8 7 Again, misleading nomencla-
ture came into play. Although most attorneys who had been practicing
under BAPCPA realized the requirements to be entitled to an excep-
tion, pro se debtors were the most in danger of misconstruing this sim-
plified form. As they likely understood it, if they had not received the
credit counseling prior to filing, then they were in need of a waiver. By
merely checking the box for waiver, they had not fulfilled the require-
ments of § 109(h)(2), (h)(3), or (h)(4). Although the instructions sheet
for the Voluntary Petition provided a summary of the exceptions to
the pre-petition credit counseling requirement, 88 typical pro se debt-
"define[d] 'certify' as 'to attest esp. authoritatively or formally."' Id. (citing WEBSTER's THIRD
NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 362 (2002)). See also In re Fields, 337 B.R.173, 179 n.6 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 2005) (using dictionary definitions to divine the meaning of certification).
85. Cleaver, 333 B.R. at 434. The court found the debtor's motion, intended as such a certifica-
tion under § 109(h)(1), "marginally [came] within this minimum definition," although it was
neither an affidavit, nor a declaration under oath, and did not contain the typical certification
language. Id. However, the court found it to be sufficient because it stated "some facts" and was
signed by the debtor and his attorney. Id. The court found the motion signed by both the debtor
and his attorney indicated that the pleading was so signed by the debtor to verify the truth of its
contents, as was the local custom in the jurisdiction. Id.
86. In re Henderson, 339 B.R. 34, 38 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006). Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 9011 requires that any filing by an attorney or unrepresented parties not be presented
for any improper purpose and that it must have evidentiary support. FED R. BANKR. P. 9011.
87. Official Bankruptcy Form 1, 11 U.S.C. (Oct. 2005). Specifically, the form provided:
Certification Concerning Debt Counseling by Individual/Joint Debtor(s)
[ I I/we have received approved budget and credit counseling during the 180-day pe-
riod preceding the filing of this petition.
[ ] I/we request a waiver of the requirement to obtain budget and credit counseling
prior to filing based upon exigent circumstances. (Must attach certification describing.).
Id.
88. The Instructions for Completing Official Form 1, Voluntary Petition, in the section titled
Certification Concerning Debt Counseling by Individual/Joint Debtors, states as follows:
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ors would never knew that, in order to be entitled to such waiver, they
were required to meet the all of statutory elements of the exceptions,
specifically, the three elements required under § 109(h)(3)(A).
Therefore, apparently to alleviate some of this confusion, a revised
Official Voluntary Petition Form was adopted, replacing the former
two boxes on the prior form.89 Labeled "Exhibit D," this portion of
the Voluntary Petition now requires every individual debtor to check
a box, indicating he or she, or, if the case is joint, each debtor, has
completed and signed an Exhibit D that is attached and made a part
of the petition.90 Exhibit D, adopted in October of 2006, entitled "Ex-
Before an individual or joint debtor can file a bankruptcy case, section 109(h) of the
Bankruptcy Code requires the debtor to receive a briefing from an approved nonprofit
budget and credit counseling agency. The briefing may be an individual or group brief-
ing and may be conducted in person, by telephone, or over the Internet. The briefing
must outline the opportunities for available credit counseling and must assist the debtor
in performing a related budget analysis. The clerk of the bankruptcy court maintains a
list of approved of credit counselors in the district that is available to the public at the
office of the clerk and on the court's website. 11 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). Interim Bank-
ruptcy Rule 1007(c) requires the debtor to file with the petition a certificate from the
credit counseling service describing the services provided and a copy of a debt repay-
ment plan developed through the credit counseling service. Exceptions to this require-
ment are limited to those provided in 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(h)(2) and (h)(4). If a debtor
requests credit counseling and is unable to obtain the services required by the Code
within five days of requesting them, § 109(h)(3) provides a limited waiver of the credit
counseling requirement. The debtor must attach to the petition a certification of "exi-
gent circumstances," and obtain the credit counseling within 30 days after filing the
petition. The debtor should check the appropriate box, based on whether the debtor
has obtained the required counseling or not, and attach the required documents.
U.S. Courts, Instructions for Completing Official Form 1, Voluntary Petition, http://www.us
courts.gov/rules/RevisedRules andForms/Form_Bl-Instr.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
89. The 2006 Committee Notes regarding the Voluntary Petition, Form 1, provides in part:
Exhibit D replaces the section formerly labeled "Certification Concerning Debt Coun-
seling by Individual/Joint Debtor(s)." Early cases decided under the 2005 amendments
to the Bankruptcy Code indicate that individual debtors may not be aware of the re-
quirement to obtain pre[-]petition credit counseling, the few and very narrow excep-
tions to that requirement, or the potentially dire consequences to their efforts to obtain
bankruptcy relief if they fail to complete the requirement. Accordingly, page 2 of the
petition instructs individual debtors to attach a completed Exhibit D and makes it clear
that each spouse in a joint case must complete and attach a separate Exhibit D. Exhibit
D itself includes a warning about the requirement to obtain counseling and the conse-
quences of failing to fulfill this requirement. It further provides checkboxes and instruc-
tions concerning the additional documents that are required in particular
circumstances, in order to minimize the number of cases which the court must dismiss
for ineligibility.
U.S. Courts, Committee Notes, Form 1 (Oct. 2006), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/BKForms_06
_Official/Form_1_CNCum_1006.pdf.
90. See Official Bankruptcy Form 1, 11 U.S.C. (Jan. 2008), available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/rules/BK Forms_08_Official/B_0010108f.pdf. Specifically, the form provides:
Exhibit D
(To be completed by every individual debtor. If a joint petition is filed, each spouse
must complete and attach a separate Exhibit D.)
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hibit D-Individual Debtor's Statement of Compliance with Credit
Counseling Requirement," requires a debtor to choose one of five
boxes.91 The five boxes are: (1) a statement that credit counseling was
[ ] Exhibit D completed and signed by the debtor is attached and made a part of this
petition.
If this is a joint petition:
[ ] Exhibit D also completed and signed by the joint debtor is attached and made a part
of this petition.
Id.
91. The form reads as follows:
Official Form 1, Exhibit D (10/06)
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
District of
In re Case No.
Debtor(s) (if known)
EXHIBIT D - INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR'S STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE
WITH CREDIT COUNSELING REQUIREMENT
Warning: You must be able to check truthfully one of the five statements regarding
credit counseling listed below. If you cannot do so, you are not eligible to file a bank-
ruptcy case, and the court can dismiss any case you do file. If that happens, you will lose
whatever filing fee you paid, and your creditors will be able to resume collection activi-
ties against you. If your case is dismissed and you file another bankruptcy case later,
you may be required to pay a second filing fee and you may have to take extra steps to
stop creditors' collection activities.
Every individual debtor must file this Exhibit D. If a joint petition is filed, each spouse
must complete and file a separate Exhibit D. Check one of the five statements below and
attach any documents as directed.
[ 11. Within the 180 days before the filing of my bankruptcy case, I received a brief-
ing from a credit counseling agency approved by the United States trustee or bank-
ruptcy administrator that outlined the opportunities for available credit counseling and
assisted me in performing a related budget analysis, and I have a certificate from the
agency describing the services provided to me. Attach a copy of the certificate and a
copy of any debt repayment plan developed through the agency.
[ 1 2. Within the 180 days before the filing of my bankruptcy case, I received a brief-
ing from a credit counseling agency approved by the United States trustee or bank-
ruptcy administrator that outlined the opportunities for available credit counseling and
assisted me in performing a related budget analysis, but I do not have a certificate from
the agency describing the services provided to me. You must file a copy of a certificate
from the agency describing the services provided to you and a copy of any debt repay-
ment plan developed through the agency no later than 15 days after your bankruptcy case
is filed.
[ ] 3. I certify that I requested credit counseling services from an approved agency but
was unable to obtain the services during the five days from the time I made my request,
and the following exigent circumstances merit a temporary waiver of the credit counsel-
ing requirement so I can file my bankruptcy case now. [Must be accompanied by a
motion for determination by the court.][Summarize exigent circumstances here.]
If the court is satisfied with the reasons stated in your motion, it will send you an
order approving your request. You must still obtain the credit counseling briefing
within the first 30 days after you file your bankruptcy case and promptly file a certifi-
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obtained within the 180 days pre-petition and that a certificate from
an approved credit counseling agency is attached; (2) a statement that
credit counseling was obtained within the 180 days pre-petition and
that a certificate from an approved credit counseling agency is not at-
tached (therefore, further requiring a debtor to obtain the certificate
and file the same with the court within fifteen days); (3) a statement
seeking a temporary waiver under § 109(h)(3) (therefore, requiring
the debtor to attach a motion for determination by the court); (4) a
statement demonstrating that the debtor is not required to complete
the counseling because he or she meets the statutory requirement of
§ 109(h)(4); or (5) a statement demonstrating the debtor is not re-
quired to complete the counseling because he or she meets the statu-
tory requirements of § 109(h)(2). 92 The end of Exhibit D includes
certification language, similar to that found in § 1746 and requires the
debtor's signature. 93
Exhibit D, adopted in October of 2006, addressed many of the pre-
viously voiced concerns as to the formatting of the certification. It in-
cluded the "penalty of perjury" language of § 1746 and had to be
cate from the agency that provided the briefing, together with a copy of any debt man-
agement plan developed through the agency. Any extension of the 30-day deadline can
be granted only for cause and is limited to a maximum of 15 days. A motion for exten-
sion must be filed within the 30-day period. Failure to fulfill these requirements may
result in dismissal of your case. If the court is not satisfied with your reasons for filing
your bankruptcy case without first receiving a credit counseling briefing, your case may
be dismissed.
[ ]4. I am not required to receive a credit counseling briefing because of: [Check the
applicable statement.] [Must be accompanied by a motion for determination by the
court.]
[ ]Incapacity. (Defined in 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(4) as impaired by reason of mental ill-
ness or mental deficiency so as to be incapable of realizing and making rational deci-
sions with respect to financial responsibilities.);
[ ]Disability. (Defined in 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(4) as physically impaired to the extent of
being unable, after reasonable effort, to participate in a credit counseling briefing in
person, by telephone, or through the Internet.);
[]Active military duty in a military combat zone.
[] 5. The United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator has determined that the
credit counseling requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) does not apply in this district.
I certify under penalty of perjury that the information provided above is true and
correct.
Signature of Debtor:
Date:
Official Bankruptcy Form 1, Exhibit D, 11 U.S.C. (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/rules/BK Forms_06_OfficiallForm_1_ExhD_1006.pdf.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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signed by the debtor, thereby eradicating the controversy over format-
ting described previously. However, the requirement of a separately
filed motion was a new addition to the form. This requirement was not
part of the statute itself. Although a motion is also required under the
§ 109(h)(4) box, the procedure that a court decides this issue after
notice and hearing is built into the language of § 109(h)(4) explicitly. 94
A motion for a § 109(h)(3) request served a record-keeping purpose,
allowing a court to enter an order upon a properly filed motion,
thereby alleviating some confusion on dockets and clerks' offices na-
tionwide. But, the motion created more confusion over procedural
and substantive requirements for a request under § 109(h)(3). As to
the procedural requirements, the motion could have imposed an addi-
tional burden on already confused debtors. First, pro se debtors could
have been confused as to the formatting and drafting of motions.
Also, service of the motion could have resulted in yet another hurdle
for a pro se debtor. Second, if represented, was the motion to be
signed by the attorney or the debtor or both?
The substantive requirements for the request were still quite vague.
The preliminary issue of the title of the document seeking an exemp-
tion under § 109(h)(3)(A) was still unknown. Exhibit D was labeled a
"statement." 95 Then, Exhibit D required a "motion. '96 Neither docu-
ment carried the title of "certification" as required by § 109(h)(3)(A).
A core issue was whether this motion was the "certification" required
by § 109(h)(3)(A) or whether Exhibit D was the "certification"? Or,
were both considered in tandem to be the certification? If so, did both
need to comply with the requirements of § 109(h)(3)(A) or only the
motion? If only the motion, did the motion need to be signed by the
debtor under penalty of perjury?
In response to these various concerns, a proposed new Federal Rule
of Bankruptcy Procedure and an Exhibit D were created. The revised
Exhibit D is essentially the same form; however, it deletes any refer-
ence to a "motion" to be filed by the debtor. This newly revised Ex-
hibit D may be adopted for use in December of 2009. The proposed
new Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1017.197 addresses some
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(4) (2006).
95. See Official Bankruptcy Form 1, Exhibit D, 11 U.S.C. (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/rules/BKForms06 Official/Form_1_Exh-D-1006.pdf.
96. Id.
97. See proposed FED. R. BANKR. P. 1017.1, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/pro-
posed0807/BK_Memo_5_8_07.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2008). It provides:
Rule 1017.1. Exemption from Pre[-]petition Credit Counseling Requirement
A certification filed by an individual debtor under § 109(h)(3) of the Code shall be
deemed satisfactory to the court unless the court, on its own motion or on motion of a
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of the record-keeping concerns that were previously addressed with
the motion required under the former Exhibit D. Proposed Rule
1017.1 provides that a debtor's certification under § 109(h)(3) will be
deemed satisfactory unless a motion is filed by the court or a party in
interest within fourteen days after the debtor files the certification and
the court enters an order that the certification is not satisfactory. 98
The court is required to enter such an order within twenty-one days
after the certification is filed.99 This proposed rule appears to address
the record-keeping concerns and provides a presumption of validity of
a certification. However, this rule with its presumption of validity may
go too far. It overrides the statutory duty of the court under
§ 109(h)(3)(A)(iii) to make an affirmative determination of whether
the certification is satisfactory. Furthermore, whether it will succeed in
eliminating or reducing the challenges to the certifications or stream-
line the process for the courts is yet to be seen.
Regardless of the impact of the new proposed rule, the details in the
certification to satisfy the elements of § 109(h)(3)(A) are still vague
and will be difficult for debtors, particularly those acting pro se, to
comprehend. For example, the concept of exigent circumstances is still
not defined. The simple task of requiring debtors to list the names of
the agencies contacted and the dates of such contacts is not included.
Notably, for debtors seeking an exemption under § 109(h)(4), Exhibit
D explicitly sets forth definitions from § 109(h)(4) of the terms of in-
capacity and disability. 100
The amended Voluntary Petition did little to resolve the issues sur-
rounding the "certification" required under § 109(h)(3)(A). Inclusion
of Exhibit D was an appropriate method by which to highlight the
requirements for debtors on the Voluntary Petition and should remain
intact. However, the attached Exhibit D should be modified with re-
gard to the requirements of § 109(h)(3)(A). First, as proposed, it
should delete any reference to a motion and use the appropriate term
"certification" instead. Although there is efficacy in requiring a mo-
tion for record keeping purposes, such purposes are overridden by the
desire for uniformity and clarity for debtors and are taken care of by
party in interest filed no later than 14 days after the filing of the certification and served
on the debtor and the United States trustee, enters an order finding the certification is
not satisfactory. The order shall be entered no later than 21 days after the filing of the
certification and shall specify why the certification is not satisfactory.
Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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new proposed Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1017.1.101 Sec-
ond, Exhibit D should maintain the format for signing under penalty
of perjury used in 28 U.S.C. § 1746102 and, for individuals seeking an
exception under § 109(h)(3), should include a format similar to the
Hubbard standard. 10 3 The creation of a simple official certification
form would alleviate many of these issues and provide clear guidance
to bankruptcy practitioners, and debtors, especially pro se debtors,
who are encountering this issue for the first time.10 4
B. A Call to Clarify the Statutory Elements in § 109(h) (3) (A)
In addition to the Judicial Conference revising Exhibit D, Congress
should establish clear definitions for the terms and phrases found
within § 109(h)(3)(A), similar to the ones set forth in § 109(h)(4). Al-
though courts are still required to engage in some interpretation in
§ 109(h)(4) cases, there is somewhat less confusion and ambiguity as
to the meaning of the terms therein. Based upon the opinions address-
ing § 109(h)(3) so far, there needs to be guidelines set for the ele-
ments of § 109(h)(3)(A), including the definition of exigent
circumstances, the requirements found in § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii), and the
definition of "satisfactory to the court." With these guidelines in place,
consistency should emerge in opinions.
Included within § 109(h)(4) are statutory definitions for the terms
required to meet the exception.10 5 Specifically, § 109(h)(4) defines
"incapacity" to mean "the debtor is impaired by reason of mental ill-
ness or mental deficiency so that he is incapable of realizing and mak-
ing rational decisions with respect to his financial responsibilities.' u0 6
The section further defines "disability" to mean "the debtor is so
physically impaired as to be unable, after reasonable effort, to partici-
101. See supra note 97.
102. See Dixon v. LaBarge (In re Dixon), 338 B.R. 383, 387 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006) (finding
that because the debtor's certificate was sworn to, it was "sufficient under both lines of cases").
103. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing the Hubbard standard).
104. See In re Davenport, 335 B.R. 218, 220 n.4 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (noting that until
format is established by rule or official form, the filing of a verified motion or affidavit or oral
testimony at a hearing would suffice). Some courts have adopted a form for the certification
under §109(h)(3)(A). See, e.g., United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Indi-
ana, Motion Requesting Temporary Waiver of Credit Counseling Requirement, http://www.insb.
uscourts.govfWebForms/genorder/exigentcircumstances-motion.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2008);
United States Bankruptcy Court of the District of South Carolina, Certificate of Inability to
Complete Pre-Petition Credit Counseling, http://www.scb.uscourts.gov/images/pdf/reforml109_h
_ 4_%20Certification.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
105. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(4) (2006).
106. Id.
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pate in an in person, telephone, or Internet briefing as required under
paragraph (1)."107
Several cases have addressed the permanent exemption provided
for in § 109(h)(4). 10 8 In one such case, In re Tulper, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado found that both debtor
spouses were "disabled" within the meaning of § 109(h)(4). 10 9 The
court found the permanent exemption is "only available in very lim-
ited circumstances," based upon the specific statutory definitions of
"incapacity" and "disability," noting the statute set "the bar for the
granting of the exemption very high."110 The court found a determina-
tion under § 109(h)(4) had to be on a case-by-case basis; however, the
court set forth a standard by which to review such claims for exemp-
tion based upon disability, requiring a showing that "(1) the debtor is
severely physically impaired; (2) the debtor has made a reasonable
effort, despite the impairment, to participate in the pre[-]petition
credit counseling; and (3) the debtor is unable, because of the impair-
ment, to participate meaningfully in an in person, telephone, or In-
ternet briefing pre[-]petition." 'n This standard closely tracks the
language of the statute and inserts the qualifiers "severely" and
"meaningfully." The court found inserting the qualifier "meaning-
fully" aligned with the congressional goal of having a debtor under-
stand the consequences of bankruptcy and the alternatives;
furthermore, the court found mere participation, without the ability to
understand what is being conveyed or the ability to learn the conse-
quences of bankruptcy, would be "meaningless ... without purpose
and utility. 1 12 The same can be said for the participation by a debtor
107. Id.
108. In re Vollmer, 361 B.R. 811 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); In re McBride, 354 B.R. 95, 98
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2006); In re Tulper, 345 B.R. 322 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006); In re Latovljevic, 343
B.R. 817 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2006); In re Stockwell, No. 06-10002, 2006 WL 1149182 (Bankr. D.
Vt. Apr. 26, 2006); In re Star, 341 B.R. 830 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006).
109. Tulper, 345 B.R. 322. Both debtors had significant health problems. Id. Specifically, the
debtor-wife suffered from "heart problems, extensive tremors, severe asthma, a bad lung, arthri-
tis, a disintegrated spine ... , and a plate in her right ankle." Id. at 324. The debtor-husband was
ninety-seven percent deaf and had problems with his hands and feet. Id. at 325.
110. Id. at 326 (emphasis in original). The court additionally noted that a congressional goal in
enacting § 109(h) was to have fewer individuals filing bankruptcy at all and, at a minimum,
Chapter 7 liquidations. Id. at 328. Because the debtors filed Chapter 13, the court found that
Congress's goal was realized, even without the pre-petition credit counseling. Id.
111. Id. at 326 (emphasis in original).
112. Id. at 327-28. Additionally, the court noted § 109(h) "avoids the absurd situation in which
a debtor would be required to obtain a briefing even if suffering from Alzheimer's disease or
some other disability that would make the briefing meaningless or even impossible." Id. at 326
(citing 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 109.09[4], 109-60 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer,
eds., 15th ed. rev. 2005)).
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in a credit counseling session held after the filing of the petition, as
provided for in § 109(h)(3)(B). How can such participation be "mean-
ingful," when, although the debtor may have the ability to understand
what is being conveyed, as well as learn the consequences of bank-
ruptcy, he has already eliminated the choice of alternatives thereto by
having filed a petition? Although a debtor could just dismiss the case
if he learned about the choices available to him outside of bankruptcy,
this scenario is unlikely, as statistics show the majority of individuals
who obtain the credit counseling still chose to file for bankruptcy.
Based on the statutory definitions set out in § 109(h)(4) and the
clarification established by the courts, a standard has been set for a
request under § 109(h)(4), which allows the exception to be met by
those qualified. 113 The definitions found in § 109(h)(4) provide some
guidance to courts interpreting the same, and, as shown below, there
is a need for similar guidance in the interpretation of § 109(h)(3)(A).
1. Defining Exigent Circumstances in § 109(h)(3)(A)(i)
An individual can evade, at least temporarily, the pre-petition credit
counseling requirement if he or she can show "exigent circumstances
that merit a waiver. ' 114 The elusiveness of the statutory language is
apparent. What constitutes exigent circumstances? Or as set forth in
the statutory language, what constitutes exigent circumstances that
merit a waiver? Most courts agree that the language sets forth a two
part test: first, a showing of exigent circumstances is required, and,
second, a showing that the exigent circumstances merit a waiver is also
required. 115 However, the agreement ends there. One line of cases
sets a minimal standard, which is met merely by a showing of immi-
nent credit collection activity, and seemingly overlooks the second
part of the analysis, which requires the exigent circumstances to merit
113. See, e.g., Vollmer, 361 B.R. at 811 (holding an incarceration was not within the congres-
sionally-defined meaning of "disability," but finding courts had the ability to permanently waive
the requirement when there was no possibility for the debtor to obtain the counseling); McBride,
354 B.R. at 98 (holding that a debtor's incarceration had "no bearing on the exigency of his need
to file" and he did not qualify for an exemption under § 109(h)(4)); Tulper, 345 B.R. 322;
Latovljevic, 343 B.R. at 822 (holding the debtor, who was incarcerated, did not present any
evidence to support exemption under § 109(h)(4) and he made an insufficient showing to sup-
port an extension under § 109(h)(3)); Stockwell, 2006 WL 1149182, at *2 (finding a medical re-
port submitted by the debtor did not support a finding of incapacity or disability for the purposes
of § 109(h)(4), as required to escape the personal financial management course required by 11
U.S.C. § 727(a)(11)); Star, 341 B.R. at 831-32 (holding incarceration of the debtor did not sup-
port a finding of disability for the purposes of § 109(h)(4), but allowing the debtor to defer the
pre-petition counseling requirement under § 109(h)(3)).
114. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)(A)(i) (2006).
115. See, e.g., Dixon v. LaBarge, (In re Dixon), 338 B.R. 383, 388 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006).
292 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
a waiver. Another line of cases sets a higher standard, which is rarely
met and seemingly vitiates the exception altogether. A balance needs
to be struck between these two extremes. 116
The more lenient approach finds mere imminent creditor collection
activity is sufficient, thereby effectively ignoring the requirement that
the exigent circumstances must merit a waiver. For example, some
courts have found an impending foreclosure of a debtor's homestead
meets the definition of exigent circumstances.' 17 The United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio stated:
[T]he common reality is that many debtors file at the last minute
just before a foreclosure sale or the loss of their money or posses-
sions to creditors .... [I]t is difficult to conceive of any exigent cir-
cumstances related to bankruptcy that would not involve impending
creditor action. Absent some sort of immediate collection activity,
there is no urgency affecting the timing of a bankruptcy filing. Con-
sequently, the immediacy of the foreclosure sale in this case appears
to be exactly the sort of exigent circumstance contemplated by the
statute.' 18
Additionally, the courts have found the freezing of a debtor's sole
bank account containing her sole source of income, 119 as well as the
116. For example, in the Federal Judicial Center's survey of bankruptcy judges regarding
BAPCPA, thirty-five percent of the 157 judges responding answered:
[T]hey treated imminent foreclosure or eviction, by itself, as an exigent circumstance,
while about 55 percent treated this as an exigent circumstance only if the debtors could
satisfactorily explain why they had not yet received credit counseling. Another 10 per-
cent said that imminent foreclosure or eviction was never an exigent circumstance.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BANKRUPTCY REFORM: VALUE OF CREDIT COUNSELING
REQUIREMENT is NOT CLEAR 38 (2007) (citing FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, IMPLEMENTING THE
BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005: EARLY EXPERI-
ENCE (2006)).
117. In re Giambrone, 365 B.R. 386, 390 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Henderson, 364 BR.
906, 908 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007) (finding a foreclosure was an exigent circumstance particularly
in Texas "where non-judicial foreclosure sales are permitted on very short notice to the bor-
rower"); In re Thomas, No. 06-10242, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 362, at *5 (Bankr. D. Kan. Mar. 14,
2006); In re Toccaline, No. 06-20218, 2006 WL 2081517, at *2 (Bankr. D. Conn. July 17, 2006); In
re Burrell, 339 B.R. 664, 666 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006); In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145, 154 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 2006); In re Childs, 335 B.R. 623, 630 (Bankr. D. Md. 2005); In re Cleaver, 333 B.R.
430, 435 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005); In re Hubbard, 333 B.R. 377, 384 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005)
("When a prospective debtor faces a loss of the family home unless immediate relief is granted
under the Bankruptcy Code, exigent circumstances exist."); In re Gee, 332 B.R. 602, 604 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 2005).
118. Cleaver, 333 B.R. at 435. See also In re Graham, 336 B.R. 292, 297 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
2005) (stating exigent circumstances would not be difficult to find "based on impending creditor
action that will materially affect the debtor or dependants of the debtor").
119. In re Morales, No. 806-70854-478, 2006 WL 2050555, at *3 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. May 24,
2006); In re Westenberger, No. 0610477-BKC-RBR, 2006 WL 1105008, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
Apr. 25, 2006).
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repossession of a debtor's car 120 and a garnishment, 121 constituted exi-
gent circumstances.
One court, which set a very minimal standard for the exigent cir-
cumstances determination, required "only that the debtor state the ex-
istence of some looming event that renders pre[-]petition credit
counseling to be infeasible. The standard is not one of 'excusable neg-
lect' that would require the Court to delve into the reasons why the
exigent circumstances occurred. 1 22 Likewise, in In re Giambrone, the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New York
held that even though debtors may have had ample notice of an im-
pending foreclosure and could have secured the required pre-petition
counseling in advance of the auction, "this fact sp[o]k[e] more to irrel-
evant attributions of fault than to the sufficiency of exigent circum-
stances. '123 The court found the test to require that "[i]f debtors
reasonably attempt to obtain credit counseling during the interval be-
tween learning about this requirement and the occurrence of the exi-
gent event, their exigent circumstances should merit a waiver. ' 124 The
court found the pre-petition requirement did not require any absence
of fault or culpability on the part of the debtors, and, therefore, the
exigency of a debtor's self-imposed situation would satisfy the first
prong of § 109(h)(3)(A). 125
However, another line of cases requires a higher showing to meet
the exigent circumstances requirement. Situations that have not been
found to meet the definition of exigent circumstances include: a lack
120. Hubbard, 333 B.R. at 384 ("An individual facing the immediate and permanent loss of
her sole means of transportation generally faces exigent circumstances that satisfy the require-
ments of § 109(h)(3)(A)(i)."). See also In re Davenport, 335 B.R. 218, 221 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2005).
121. In re Rodriguez, 336 B.R. 462, 476 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2005). Although the court found
that a garnishment might constitute an exigent circumstance, it did not so find in the case at bar
because the debtors had been through two previous garnishments. Id. The court also inferred
from the facts that the debtors were the subject of a continuing garnishment, which lessened the
"exigency" of their situation in the court's opinion. Id.
122. In re Childs, 335 B.R. 623, 630 (Bankr. D. Md. 2005) (holding debtors showing of "the
occurrence of a supervening event that precipitated the emergent need to file a bankruptcy peti-
tion" constitued exigent circumstances). See also Henderson, 339 B.R. at 39 (holding a debtor's
showing under § 109(h)(3)(A)(i) was not "an overwhelmingly high one," and, "[a]t a minimum,
'exigent circumstances' should be particular to the putative debtor, and should support the con-
clusion that the putative debtor was confronted with an urgent situation that rendered him or
her unable to comply with the budget and credit counseling requirement").
123. 365 B.R. 386, 390 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2007). The court held "[e]xigency relates solely to
issues of immediacy, and not to any notions of causation, justification, or excusability. Even
when circumstances are of a debtor's own making, they will nonetheless become exigent as the
moment when immediate action or aid is required." Id. at 389.
124. Id. at 390.
125. Id.
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of funds to pay the credit counseling agency for the pre-petition coun-
seling;12 6 a need for advice as to legal rights;1 27 and a scheduled fore-
closure sale.12 8 For example, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the
Eighth Circuit found although an impending foreclosure qualified as
an exigent circumstance, it did not merit a waiver because the debtor
had twenty days' notice of the sale.129 Additionally, one court has
stated that a sheriff's sale:
[D]oes not in and of itself merit a deferral of the credit counseling
requirement .... [T]he proper focus under § 109(h) is not on the
circumstances that hastened or precipitated the bankruptcy filing
but on whether those circumstance or any other prevented the
debtor from being able to obtain credit counseling prior to filing for
bankruptcy. 130
A debtor's presumed notice of the sale is one reason for finding a
foreclosure not to be an exigent circumstance, making any claim of
exigent circumstances based upon a pending foreclosure sale merely a
debtor's "self-created emergency."1 31
Therefore, to follow the reasoning of courts that require a higher
showing, exigent circumstances would have to be an emergency that is
not due to imminent credit collection activity (in order to differentiate
126. In re Curington, No. 05-38188, 2005 WL 3752229, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Dec. 19,
2005).
127. In re Henderson, 339 B.R. 34, 40 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that allegation did not,
"standing alone, distinguish [the debtor's] circumstances from the circumstances of thousands of
debtors who,... are required to pursue bankruptcy relief without the benefit of legal advice").
128. See, e.g., Hedquist v. Fokkena (In re Hedquist), 342 B.R. 295, 298 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006);
In re Afolabi, 343 B.R. 195, 198 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2006); In re DiPinto, 336 B.R. 693, 697 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 2006).
129. Dixon v. LaBarge, (In re Dixon), 338 B.R. 383, 388 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006).
130. Afolabi, 343 B.R. at 198.
131. Id. The court also placed little credence in the debtor's claim that the reason for waiting
until the eve of foreclosure was due, in part, to last minute negotiations with the mortgage com-
pany. Id. The court questioned whether a mortgage company would even engage in serious ne-
gotiations that late in the process and opined the "'negotiations' may have been nothing more
than [the debtor's] one-sided attempt to stop the inevitable." Id. Last, the court stated it could
not "conclude that such negotiations prevented him from obtaining credit counseling. Instead,
[the debtor] made an unfortunate choice to place all of his eggs in one basket and to avail
himself of bankruptcy protection only after it became clear that he could not prevent the sher-
iff's sale .... Id. See also Hedquist, 342 B.R. at 298 (stating "a bankruptcy court does not abuse
its discretion in finding that a debtor's waiting to file a bankruptcy petition until the eve of a
foreclosure, when the debtor has had ample notice of the foreclosure, does not constitute exigent
circumstances meriting a waiver of the prebankruptcy briefing requirement."); DiPinto, 336 B.R.
at 697 (noting debtor's claim that he had found a last minute buyer for his property, which was
the subject of a foreclosure, did not suffice to demonstrate why he had not been diligent). But see
In re Toccaline, No. 06-20218, 2006 WL 2081517, at *2 (Bankr. D. Conn. July 17, 2006) (holding
"the sudden collapse of the petitioners' mortgage negotiations on the eve of the scheduled fore-
closure sale constitutes circumstances sufficiently exigent to satisfy the requirements of the first
requirement of the three-part test").
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among debtors) and that is not an emergency involving the debtor's
personal health or well-being (because such an emergency would
likely be covered by § 109(h)(4)). However, such instances, although
exigent, would probably not require an immediate filing; the debtor
could just wait to file until the emergency was over. Therefore, the
question becomes what action against the debtor's property, outside
of imminent creditor collection, would suffice for these courts? 132
Of the cases reported, it appears few seem to answer that question.
In In re Hess, a debtor's case was filed without a certificate from a
credit counseling agency and without a certification alleging exigent
circumstances. 133 However, the court found the debtor satisfied
§ 109(h)(3)(A)(i) because her failure to comply with § 109(h)(3)(A)
was a result of "acts and circumstances of others that were both be-
yond her control and extraordinary. ' 134 Specifically, the debtor had
filled out her paperwork at her attorney's office, signed the petition,
and left the documents at the attorney's office until she completed the
credit counseling briefing and could supply the certificate. 135 How-
ever, during the attorney's absence from the office due to a medical
emergency involving the attorney, an employee in the attorney's of-
fice, assuming the documents to be complete, filed the debtor's peti-
tion and supporting documents.1 36
Are these extreme scenarios the types of situations envisioned by
Congress to constitute exigent circumstances? Obviously they will suf-
fice; however, it is unlikely that Congress created an exception to
§ 109(h) to capture these extreme and rare occurrences. Again, Con-
gress labeled the exception "exigent circumstances," not "extreme cir-
cumstances," and a definition requiring such extremes could be rarely
used and would not fulfill the purpose of helping the "honest, but un-
fortunate debtor."
Because most debtors file bankruptcy due to financial difficulties,
that is, they are unable to meet their obligations and have creditor
collection activity, it is likely Congress knew all debtors believed
themselves to have "exigent circumstances" at the time of filing a
bankruptcy petition. Therefore, it appears that a minimal standard is
insufficient, specifically a standard ignoring the second prong of the
analysis, which requires a showing that the exigent circumstances
132. See In re Cleaver, 333 B.R. 430, 435 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005) (positing the same
question).
133. 347 B.R. 489, 493 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2006).
134. Id. at 499.
135. Id. at 493.
136. Id. The court found that the facts before it fell "well within the narrow exception carved
out for catastrophic, extraordinary circumstances." Id. at 500.
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merit a waiver. If exigent circumstances were merely defined to in-
clude financial difficulties, such as a typical foreclosure, the exception
found in § 109(h)(3) would swallow the rule, allowing each and every
debtor to claim an exception to the pre-petition credit counseling re-
quirement.1 37 On the other hand, to define it narrowly as something
specific to an individual debtor would make it akin to § 109(h)(4),
which already provides an exemption for a debtor who is suffering
from an incapacity or disability. 138 Based upon the statutory language,
Congress evidently required a lesser showing in § 109(h)(3) because
the exemption is only temporary.
However, merely stating § 109(h)(3)(A)(i) requires a two-prong
analysis, a showing of (1) exigent circumstances (2) that merit a
waiver, still beckons the question of what are exigent circumstances
and what type of exigent circumstances merit a waiver? The term "exi-
gent circumstances" is not defined in BAPCPA. Depending on the ju-
risdiction in which a debtor files bankruptcy, the definition varies.
139
According to Black's Law Dictionary, "exigent" means "[r]equiring
immediate action or aid; urgent. '140 Black's defines "exigent circum-
stances" to be "[a] situation that demands unusual or immediate ac-
tion and that may allow people to circumvent usual procedures.
141
These dictionary definitions provide little guidance, other than to fo-
cus the courts' attention on the uniqueness of a debtor's claim. Addi-
tionally, how "exigent" can they be if one must wait five days before
filing? 142
The second part of the analysis requires the court to assess whether
the exigent circumstances merit a waiver. To provide any substance to
137. See In re Rodriguez, 336 B.R. 462, 475 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2005).
It is hard to imagine an exigent circumstance sufficient to motivate an immediate bank-
ruptcy filing that does not concern creditor collection activity of some sort. Still, virtu-
ally every bankruptcy has such factors looming in the background somewhere.
Congress did not, in § 109(h), grant each and every debtor a pass on the counseling
requirement due to an impending foreclosure, garnishment, trial, or other filing mo-
tivator. It is clear enough that § 109(h)(3)(A) exemptions are intended to be the excep-
tion, not the rule.
Id.
138. See supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text. One court has likened the definition of
exigent circumstances to the situations exempting a debtor from the pre-petition credit counsel-
ing requirement found in § 109(h)(4), noting that something more than "mere inconvenience to
the debtor is required if the credit counseling briefing is to be waived, even temporarily." In re
Curington, No. 05-38188, 2005 WL 3752229, at * 5 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Dec. 19, 2005).
139. Id. at *4 (noting that exigent circumstances "cannot be uniformly defined").
140. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 260 (8th ed. 2004).
141. BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 614 (8th ed. 2004).
142. In re Wallert, 332 B.R. 884, 889 n.4 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005) (noting "the counter-intui-
tiveness of § 109(h)(3)(A)").
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the statutory language of § 109(h)(3)(A)(i), it is imperative that courts
give meaning, not just mere lip-service, to the requirement that the
circumstances must "merit a waiver. ' 143 But, what is involved in this
analysis? It can be argued, like the lenient line of cases, the "merit a
waiver" determination is superfluous because a court is already called
upon to determine whether the certification is satisfactory under
§ 109(h)(3)(A)(iii). However, as written, the statutory language does
require two independent findings: (1) that the exigent circumstances
merit a waiver, and (2) that the certification is satisfactory.
The best approach is to look at each case individually and to deter-
mine whether the debtor faced exigent circumstances that differenti-
ate him or her from a typical individual seeking bankruptcy relief.144
143. As stated by the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit:
"[E]xigent" indicates that the debtor finds himself in a situation in which adverse
events are imminent and will occur before the debtor is able to avail himself of the
statutory briefing. Virtually, all of the cases in which the exigent circumstances certifi-
cate is filed will, in fact, involve exigent circumstances. After all, the reason that such
debtors are filing bankruptcy quickly and before they receive the briefing is because
they feel that they are unable to wait. The real question for the court in such certifica-
tions will usually be whether or not those exigent circumstances merit the statutory
waiver.
Dixon v. LaBarge (In re Dixon), 338 B.R. 383, 388 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006). The existence of
"exigent circumstances" alone is insufficient because:
In the context of a bankruptcy filing without the requisite credit counseling, the circum-
stances presented obviously have to relate in some way to the urgency and need to file.
And they must establish something sufficiently different from or more pressing than
the usual or typical motivations to file bankruptcy so as to justify dispensing with the
requirement of prefiling counseling .... [T]he described and certified facts must show
what makes this debtor different from all others who are expected to comply with
§109(h)(1).
In re Rodriguez, 336 B.R. 462, 471 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2005).
144. Another definition is "subjective," defined as:
[W]hether the debtor was actually precluded by his or her circumstances from ob-
taining the briefing. This is a fact specific inquiry into the good faith efforts of the
debtor to comply with the credit counseling requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. The
debtor's knowledge (or lack thereof) may be relevant here. This is not to say that
debtor may simply stick his or her head into sand and do nothing. However, there is no
bright line rule guiding a bankruptcy judge in this endeavor. How well educated are the
debtors? What is their financial situation? Did the debtors have the ability to seek
counsel at an earlier stage of the insolvency, but chose to not do so for reasons that are
unacceptable to the court? Did any of these or other circumstances render the failure
to obtain the pre-petition credit counseling beyond the reasonable control of the
debtors?
In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145, 155 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006). One court has gone so far as to add that
one is not entitled to an exemption if the filing, "without counseling, does not ameliorate or
solve the exigent circumstances which [the debtor] offers as the basis for the exemption." In re
Anderson, No. 06-00047S, 2006 WL 314539, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Feb. 6, 2006). In that case,
the debtor-wife filed a certification under §109(h)(3)(A), alleging exigent circumstances relating
to the garnishment of her husband's wages and the loss of her job. Id. at *1. The court found that
even if it provided an exemption to the wife, it was doubtful her bankruptcy would have pre-
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Again, a failure to do so would possibly result in every debtor being
able to claim the exemption. Albeit the most central issue in
§ 109(h)(3), courts must define exigent circumstances realistically, en-
visioning some creditor collection activity, but the more central focus
should be on whether it merits a waiver, thereby not allowing the ex-
emption to swallow the rule.
2. Parsing through the Requirements of § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii)
In addition to demonstrating exigent circumstances that merit a
waiver, § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii) requires an allegation that "the debtor re-
quested credit counseling services from an approved nonprofit budget
and credit counseling agency, but was unable to obtain services...
during the 5-day period beginning on the date on which the debtor
made that request.1 145 Regardless of whether courts struggle with the
interpretation of exigent circumstances, this provision appears to
make a clear cut decision as to whether an individual fulfills the re-
quirements of § 109(h)(3)(A): one must contact an agency but be una-
ble to obtain services within the five-day period from that request.
146
Although seemingly a bright line rule, this Subsection is also subject
to varying interpretations and is the Subsection upon which most re-
quests for exemption under § 109(h)(3)(A) fail.147 Upon a cursory
reading of this Subsection, it is evident that it is not the model of spec-
ificity or clarity. Many courts have struggled with the discrete sub-
elements of § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii), including: the number of agencies to
be contacted; the "unable to obtain" language; and the five day
period.148
vented the garnishment of her husband's wages because the husband's case was dismissed for
failure to file a certificate under § 109(h) or to seek an exemption. Id. at *2.
145. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii) (2006).
146. See In re Talib, 335 B.R. 417, 422 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005) (noting § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii) is an
objective test, which "obviate[s] the need for [a] [c]ourt to ... second guess[ ] ... [a] debtor's
procrastination").
147. See, e.g., In re Henderson, 364 B.R. 906, 915 n.14 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007) (making an
"unscientific guess" that ninety-nine percent of cases seeking a waiver under § 109(h)(3)(A)
failed to allege a pre-petition attempt to request counseling).
148. Additionally, although not a perceived ambiguity from the language of the statute, one
court has questioned whether a debtor is required to request such services or whether a debtor's
counsel can request such services on behalf of the debtor in order to fulfill this obligation. In re
Hubbard, 333 B.R. 377, 385 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (noting debtors cannot rely on their attor-
neys' general determinatiop, not specific to those debtors at issue, that services are not
available).
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a. "An Agency," or So It Says
The language in the statute is clear and unambiguous; a debtor is to
request such services from "an approved nonprofit budget and credit
counseling agency. ' 149 Clearly, "an" is defined as one, a singular
agency, and some courts have defined it as such.150 This language
clearly opens a Pandora's box. First, a debtor could request services
from one agency and upon learning that agency was unable to provide
services, believe his or her obligation has been fulfilled. Second, a
debtor's counsel, after describing the exception provision in
§ 109(h)(3)(A), might steer a debtor to an agency that the attorney
knows "typically" cannot provide such services within five days due to
a backlog or some other reason. Both situations would be permissible
interpretations of an attempt to contact an agency under the
Subsection.
Although the language provides that "an" agency be contacted, the
better interpretation would impose upon debtors a good faith attempt
at contacting an approved agency, which would likely entail attempt-
ing to contact multiple agencies. To support the interpretation that
Congress did not intend that only one agency be contacted, 11 U.S.C.
§ 102(7) specifically states "the singular includes the plural.' 151 There-
fore, debtors should be required to list in the certification, among
other things, the number of agencies contacted and how those agen-
cies were located.
b. "Unable to Obtain" Requirement May Be Unable To Be Met
In addition to divining the number of agencies to be contacted, one
must also divine the meaning of the language "unable to obtain." One
court has posited that "unable to obtain" should be "judged by what a
debtor can reasonably accomplish in light or [sic] his or her particular,
and likely exigent, circumstances," and should not be "determined
simply by looking at what a credit counseling agency offers a
149. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii) (2006).
150. Dixon v. LaBarge (In re Dixon), 338 B.R. 383, 387 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006); In re Graham,
336 B.R. 292, 297 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2005) (finding "no express requirement in § 109(h) that a
debtor exhaust all credit counseling options or that a debtor absolutely accept any offer of coun-
seling, not matter how inconvenient or onerous"); Hubbard, 333 B.R. at 387 (noting the burden
is on the United States trustee to make the determination of available credit counseling agencies,
and debtors are not required "to scour the field for other providers"). But see In re DiPinto, 336
B.R. 693, 699 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (noting that granting a waiver under § 109(h) to a debtor
who solely contacted one agency would "reward token effort"); In re Essien, 358 B.R. 286
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (imposing sanctions on a debtor who provided a false affidavit and false
testimony regarding his pre-petition contacts with credit counseling agency and his unsuccessful
attempts to obtain the required pre-petition credit counseling).
151. 11 U.S.C. § 102(7) (2006).
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debtor.' 52 Practically speaking a debtor could claim he or she was
"unable to obtain" the services for a variety of reasons, based upon
circumstances involving the debtor, the agency, or outside influ-
ences.
153
First, the most obvious reason a debtor could claim he or she was
"unable" to obtain such services is because of a lack of funds to pay a
credit counseling agency. Notably, the pre-petition credit counseling
requirement is an "unfunded mandate," which leads one to conclude
it is to be funded by already financially-strapped debtors. Courts are
split as to the issue of whether an inability to pay the fee for the credit
counseling satisfies the "unable to obtain" requirement in
§ 109(h)(3)(A)(ii). Some courts have found the inability to pay de-
fense does not satisfy § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii). 154 Whereas, other courts
have found the inability to pay defense satisfies § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii). 155
152. Graham, 336 B.R. at 297. The court noted this interpretation furthers congressional in-
tent to provide "relief and a fresh start to honest but unfortunate debtors who otherwise would
face a series of untenable choices. Surely such a body of persons ostensibly guided by mercy
would not strand the lost so squarely between the Scylla and Charybdis!" Id. The court con-
cluded a certification must contain a statement describing "the facts and circumstances that ren-
dered the debtor unable reasonably to accept or complete the credit counseling offered within
the requisite five-day period." Id.
153. In re Dansby, 340 B.R. 564, 568 n.6 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006) (noting, under "exceptional"
circumstances, a debtor may be unable to obtain the credit counseling through no fault of the
debtor or the credit counseling agency).
154. See, e.g., In re Toccaline, No. 06-20218, 2006 WL 2081517, at *3 (Bankr. D. Conn. July 17,
2006).
155. See In re Piontek, 346 B.R. 126, 130 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006). The Piontek court found as
a "general proposition" that "a debtor who lacks sufficient resources to pay for credit counseling
may, under the right circumstances, have a de facto 'inability' to obtain pre-bankruptcy credit
counseling for the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii)." Id. However, the court did not find
a debtor-wife's inability to pay defense in a joint case to be credible or persuasive. Id. The court
noted that the debtors had not requested the credit counseling agency provide services on a pro
bono or reduced fee basis, and, without such a showing, upon a review of the debtors' schedules,
and upon the evidence that a monthly disposable income was available to pay a nominal credit
counseling fee, the court could not find the debtor-wife's inability to obtain the required pre-
petition counseling was "due to circumstances beyond her reasonable control." Id. at 131. See
also In re Morales, No. 806-70854-478, 2006 WL 2050555 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. May 24, 2006). The
Morales court found the debtor was unable to obtain the services because the debtor's sole funds
were frozen by a creditor pre-petition and because the debtor could not take off work the five
days before filing. Id. at *4. The court further found the inability to pay defense also qualified as
an "exigent circumstance" under § 109(h)(3)(A)(i). Id. at *3. See also In re Westenberger, No.
0610477- BKC-RBR, 2006 WL 1105008 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2006) (holding a debtor satis-
fied both the "exigent circumstance" requirement, as well as the "unable to obtain" requirement
in § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii), when debtor's sole bank account was frozen); In re Allen, No. 05-15847-
SSM, 2005 WL 4862559 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 1, 2005) (holding although an inability to pay for
the counseling may have been a basis for a temporary deferral, debtor failed to allege that she
requested the services but was refused due to her inability to pay). But see In re Curington, No.
05-38188, 2005 WL 3752229, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Dec. 19, 2005). The Curington court held
the debtor's lack of funds to pay the credit counseling agency did not constitute an exigent
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The latter group of courts has noted the absurdity in the situation
where a debtor could be exempt from the filing fee requirement but
still be burdened with the costs associated with the credit counseling
requirement. 156 In addition to the filing fee and attorneys' fees, if so
engaged, debtors are now required to pay a credit counseling agency,
all before filing. With regard to the first two expenses, debtors can
escape the payment. With respect to the attorneys' fee, debtors can act
pro se. With respect to the filing fee, 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f) provides for a
waiver of filing fees. 157 However, there is no such waiver for the pre-
petition credit counseling fee. In In re Raymond, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Hampshire noted several
conceptual inconsistencies in cases where the filing fee has been
waived. 158 First, a credit counseling agency would be the only party
paid if the filing fees were waived because both the court and the trus-
tee would be denied fees for the administration and serving of the
case. 159 Second, the court questioned the utility of pre-petition credit
counseling for a debtor who is so financially strapped that a waiver of
filing fees was appropriate. 160
However, to possibly remedy this situation, 11 U.S.C.
§ 111(c)(2)(B) requires that "if a fee is charged for counseling ser-
vices, [a credit counseling agency is to] charge a reasonable fee, and
provide services without regard to ability to pay the fee.' 161 What con-
stitutes a "reasonable fee" has yet to be determined. The United
States Trustee Program has not set a dollar amount for what consti-
tutes a reasonable fee.162 Additionally, the United States Trustee Pro-
circumstance. Id. Curington presents a better reasoned approach. To allow the inability to pay
defense to qualify as an exigent circumstance does not distinguish a debtor from all other debt-
ors who are facing financial straits at the time of filing; therefore, ultimately, the exception
would swallow the rule. Consequently, it appears the inability to pay defense is more suited to
the "unable to obtain" requirement.
156. See, e.g., In re Petit-Louis, 338 B.R. 132, 134 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006). The Petit-Louis
court had previously waived the filing fee for the debtor and noted the absurdity in finding that
the debtor was exempt from the filing fee requirement but might have been burdened with a cost
associated with finding an interpreter to assist in the credit counseling. Id. Upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by the United States Trustee, the court held the requirement was also
waived under § 109(h)(2). In re Petit-Louis, 344 B.R. 696, 699 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006). See also
In re Raymond, No. 06-10275-JMD. 2006 WL 1047033, at *2 (Bankr. D.N.H. Apr. 12, 2006).
157. See 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f) (2006).
158. 2006 WL 1047033, at *2 (noting "anecdotal information indicates that ... free credit
counseling services are difficult and time consuming to obtain, if they are available at all").
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 11 U.S.C. § 111(c)(2)(B) (2006).
162. Specifically, the website for the United States Trustee Program [USTP] provides:
Based on information provided by the industry, we believe this service generally will be
available for a fee ranging from free to $50. There are, however, numerous variables
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gram has not set guidelines regarding the waiver of fees, although the
United States Government Accountability Office's 2007 Report spe-
cifically recommended that the United States Trustee Program issue
formal guidance on what constitutes an individual's ability to pay.163
Even if certain agencies are providing the services without a charge,
there exist further complications. To establish an inability to pay the
fee and to get an agency to agree to waive the fee may take time;
unfortunately, most individuals who are facing exigent circumstances
do not have time.
A debtor could likewise claim he or she was unable to obtain such
services because of lack of access to the agency. Although Congress
attempted to circumvent such excuses by specifically providing that
such services could be obtained via telephone or the Internet, and by
including § 109(h)(2) to address the lack of agencies in a given district,
it is possible such issues could still arise. For example, it is possible an
individual contemplating bankruptcy could be in a position where his
car has been repossessed; his cable, internet access, and telephone ser-
vice has been disconnected; or he could be incarcerated. 164 Again, this
leads back to the exigent circumstances in which this debtor finds him-
self. Would that suffice for a court? Or, would such a circumstance rise
to the level of a "disability," thereby providing for a complete exemp-
tion under § 109(h)(4) without jumping through the hurdles imposed
by § 109(h)(3)? 165
that may impact an agency's fee structure, including geography, types of services, ad-
ministrative costs, and alternate funding sources. The USTP will give due consideration
to these factors and to the fees customarily charged in the industry for similar services
in determining the reasonableness of a particular agency's fees.
U.S. Tr. Program, Dept. of Justice, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) - Credit Counseling,
http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/ccde/cc faqs.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
163. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BANKRUPTCY REFORM: VALUE OF CREDIT
COUNSELING REQUIREMENT IS NOT CLEAR 40-41 (2007).
164. In re Vollmer, 361 B.R. 811 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007). In Vollmer, the debtor was incarcer-
ated and, as a result, had no computer access and only could make collect telephone calls. Id. at
813. The court granted the debtor a permanent waiver of the pre-petition credit counseling re-
quirement, as well as the financial management course, because the debtor was "truly unable" to
participate in either of the activities. Id. at 814-15. See also In re Walton, No. 07-41086-293, 2007
WL 980430 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2007) (providing an incarcerated debtor with a temporary
waiver after finding the debtor was unable to obtain the services because he had no internet
access and had limited telephone access, hindering his ability to complete the counseling). See
supra footnotes 105-13 for cases discussing whether an individual could use the fact of his incar-
ceration to meet the elements of §109(h)(4).
165. An enlargement of the definitions of § 109(h)(4) could encompass those individuals who
are unable to satisfy the requirements of § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii), specifically, the request and timing
issues. Therefore, this interpretation makes the exigent circumstances analysis similar to the dis-
ability or incapacity analysis in § 109(h)(4), as suggested by In re Curington, No. 05-38188, 2005
WL 3752229, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Dec. 19, 2005).
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An inability to obtain such services could also be posited on the
credit counseling agency itself, which thus far has been the most often
encountered problem. Does the credit counseling agency not answer
the phone? Is the credit counseling agency backlogged? 166 The stan-
dards for business practices indicate a credit counseling agency should
offer services within two business days of being contacted. 167 In In re
Davey, a debtor engaged in pre-petition counseling almost three
months prior to filing her petition; however, the credit counseling
agency refused to issue a certificate, arguing the counseling the debtor
underwent was not "specifically designed" for § 109 purposes, in turn
requiring the debtor to take a second course post-petition. 168 The
debtor alleged the two counseling sessions were, for all intents and
purposes, identical, and the court found any defect under § 109 was a
result of the credit counseling agency, not the debtor. 169 Another
court wrestled with this issue, finding a debtor was unable to obtain
pre-petition credit counseling under § 109(h)(3) because of a credit
counseling agency's failure to provide counseling in Creole. 170
Therefore, to alleviate this possible problem, the "unable to obtain"
language should be read in conjunction with and in light of the court's
finding of "exigent circumstances" meriting the waiver in the first
place. 171 This determination should be an objective determination,
looking at a debtor's situation, his "exigent circumstances," and be
judged against whether a reasonable person in the debtor's situation
166. See In re Anderson, No. 06-00047S, 2006 WL 314539 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Feb. 6, 2006).
One of the co-debtors in her certification under § 109(h)(3)(A) alleged that although she con-
tacted a credit counseling agency seven days prior to filing her bankruptcy petition, she was told
by the agency that "due to its case load" it could not provide services for almost a month. Id. at
*1. However, the court dismissed the petition because the co-debtor's certification failed to
prove exigent circumstances. Id. at *2.
167. Linfield, supra note 64 (stating the Best Practices Guidelines published by the Associa-
tion of Independent Consumer Credit Counseling Agencies calls for credit counseling agencies
to offer an appointment within two business days of a request).
168. No. 06-10065, 2006 WL 898101, at *1 (Bankr. D. Vt. Apr. 4, 2006).
169. Id. at *1-2. See also In re Kernan, 358 B.R. 537, 540 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2007) (asserting a
debtor was an "innocent victim of miscommunication with an approved credit counseling
agency" when the debtor sought the appropriate pre-petition counseling prior to the filing of her
petition but was given the wrong services by the agency. The court was "troubled" by the fact
that the agency had failed to clarify with the debtor the difference between the pre-petition
credit counseling as required by the Code and its "credit counseling."). But see In re Duplessis,
No. 06-14747 JNF, 2007 WL 118945 (Bankr. D. Mass. Jan. 11, 2007) (finding that although debt-
ors attempted to shift the blame to the credit counseling agency for failing to issue the appropri-
ate certificates, debtors failed to show that they had obtained the counseling pre-petition).
170. In re Petit-Louis, 338 B.R. 132 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006). Upon a motion for reconsidera-
tion filed by the United States Trustee, the court held that the requirement was also waived
under § 109(h)(2). In re Petit-Louis, 344 B.R. 696 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006).
171. In re Talib, 335 B.R. 417, 422 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005) (calling for such an interpretation).
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could have been unable to obtain the credit counseling. A major focus
should be on whether the debtor was unable to obtain the services
because of circumstances beyond his or her control. By requiring such
a showing, debtors would not be awarded for token effort or false
attempts to comply. For example, in In re Postlethwait, the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
found the debtor's claim that she was unable to obtain the credit
counseling prior to filing her petition was discredited because the
debtor's two unsuccessful attempts to obtain counseling were made in
the span of fifteen minutes, merely one hour before the filing of the
petition.172 The court based its ruling on the fact that the "exigent"
event was not to occur for at least another five days.1 73 Therefore, a
debtor should be required to use due diligence to obtain the briefing
and must be required to show his or her efforts were otherwise
thwarted because of circumstances beyond his or her control.
c. Arbitrary Five-Day Window Set in § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii)
The next quandary involves the interpretation of "during the 5-day
period beginning on the date on which the debtor made that re-
quest. ' 174 Section 109(h)(3)(A)(ii) is "awkwardly worded, making it
unclear whether a debtor is required merely to request credit counsel-
ing prior to filing for bankruptcy relief or whether such request must
be made at least five days prior to filing."'1 75 Interpreting the plain
meaning of the statute, the five days should be counted beginning
when the debtor made the request. Whether one is able to divine why
Congress chose this language, it is clear that "Congress chose not to
link the availability of credit counseling to the event which might re-
quire the Debtor to file, but rather to the date of the debtor's request
for credit counseling.' '1 76
172. 353 B.R. 428 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006).
173. Id. at 428-30.
174. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii) (2006).
175. In re Afolabi, 343 B.R. 195, 199 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2006). See also In re Henderson, 364
B.R. 906, 912 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007) (finding that there are two meanings to the term "during,"
which provide alternate interpretations. One such meaning is "throughout the duration of"; and
the other is "at a point during the course of or IN." The court found that using the second
dictionary definition would not require a five day waiting period.) (emphasis in original).
176. In re Talib, 335 B.R. 424 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005) (denying reconsideration of the earlier
case decided just eleven days prior). In Talib, the debtor claimed she was entitled to a waiver for
exigent circumstances because, although she was able to get the counseling within a five day
period from her request, the session would have been subsequent to the "exigent" event, an
impending foreclosure sale, which created her need to file. Id. The court held, looking at the
requirements of the statute, her ability to obtain the counseling within the five-day period pre-
cluded her entitlement to a waiver under § 109(h)(3). Id. at 428.
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In an attempt to divine congressional purpose, one court opined:
The statute does nothing more than mandate debtors to recognize
and start dealing with their straits of insolvency squarely, at least a
week before they will bloom out to an actual, permanent economic
loss. As Congress clearly contemplated, within that week one would
either lay the eligibility issue to rest by snagging the counseling
agency's certificate, or would qualify for the temporary exemption
and, in tandem, lay the groundwork to get the briefing and counsel-
ing promptly after filing for bankruptcy.' 77
Some courts have adopted this interpretation and require the debtor
have requested such credit counseling services at least five days prior
to filing his or her petition. 178
However, some courts have found a debtor can file a petition as
soon as the debtor learns from a credit counseling agency that the
agency will not be able to provide the counseling within five days,
thereby alleviating any waiting period.179 It is unclear why a debtor
who learns he cannot receive counseling for at least ten days cannot
file immediately, especially if there is imminent creditor action loom-
ing. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
New York in In re Giambrone rejected a "five-day waiting period" for
three reasons. 180 First, if a debtor is excused under § 109(h)(3)(A), he
177. In re Wallert, 332 B.R. 884, 890 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005) (questioning whether its holding
left "debtors subject to the vagaries of local agencies' de facto ability to promptly provide pre-
petition briefing and counseling services.").
178. See In re Dansby, 340 B.R. 564, 568 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006):
While it can be argued that Congress was not realistic in its assessment of the circum-
stances under which some debtors and their counsel may find themselves on the eve of
a foreclosure sale, repossession, or garnishment, Congress'[s] goal appears to be to
eliminate bankruptcy petitions filed by individuals who have not allowed themselves
adequate time (at least five days) to consider a bankruptcy alternative before they file.
Id. See also In re Thomas, No. 06-10242, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 362, at *6 (Bankr. D. Kan. Mar. 14,
2006) ("[Tlhe request must be made at least 5 days prior to the bankruptcy filing in order to
satisfy the requirement that pre[-]petition counseling could not be obtained within 5 days of the
request."); Talib, 335 B.R. at 424; In re Cleaver, 333 B.R. 430, 435 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006)
(noting in dicta that § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii) appears to require a five-day waiting period).
179. See In re Giambrone, 365 B.R. 386, 391(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2007) (stating the test is "not
whether the agency can provide a counseling session within five days, but whether in the context
of their circumstances, the debtors can complete within five days the counseling that must other-
wise occur prior to that exigent moment when a bankruptcy filing is necessary"). See also In re
DiPinto, 336 B.R. 693, 700 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) ("[I]f a five pre[-]petition day requirement
was what Congress intended, it simply did not put that requirement in the statute .... Thus,
while the Court finds merit to the argument that the requirement probably should be five pre[-
]petition days, the Court cannot conclude that the plain reading of the statute supports that
result.") (emphasis added); In re Graham, 336 B.R. 292, 298 n.6 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2005) (assert-
ing that "if a debtor reasonably believes that he or she cannot reasonably complete the offered
credit counseling within the five-day period, he or she need not wait until the end of the five-day
period to file his or her bankruptcy petition").
180. 365 B.R. at 391.
306 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
is still required to obtain the counseling post-petition, which would
not invoke the "temporal limitation of § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii)." '81 Second,
the imposition of a five-day waiting period would "unfairly impose
different outcomes in situations of identical exigency.' 82 Third, a
waiting period would "contradict the statutory standard that allows
bankruptcy relief in instances of exigency. 1 83 Under the Giambrone
court's holding, a debtor could request the services on the day before
filing bankruptcy, find that the services are unavailable, and be able to
meet the literal words of the exception.'8 4 This outcome was not likely
Congress's intent. This interpretation of the statutory language makes
the phrase "five days" superfluous. The question then becomes: why
insert any time period at all?
Again, the same questions are revisited. What is the purpose of such
counseling on the eve of bankruptcy and under exigent circum-
stances? Why the arbitrary five-days pre-petition? Was it to ensure
that the individual received the counseling at least five days pre-peti-
tion, thereby allowing for almost a week of exploring non-bankruptcy
alternatives? If so, the language does not say that. Even if it is inter-
preted to mean the individual requested the services six days pre-peti-
tion and luckily was able to obtain it on the day prior to the petition,
any "period of reflection" is lost. These questions and others cannot
be answered because Congress chose this language for an unknown
reason. Regardless, courts should divine Congress's intent based upon
the purpose and the statutory scheme to require the request be made
at least five days prior to the filing of the petition.
3. The Unsatisfactory Definition of "Satisfactory to the Court"
in § 109(h)(3)(A)(iii)
Again, wrought with ambiguity, § 109(h)(3)(A)(iii) has been the
subject of varying interpretations by the courts. What does "satisfac-
tory to the court" mean? Some courts believe it merely speaks to the
technical, procedural aspects of the certification itself. Others equate
"satisfactory" to mean a satisfactory showing of the other elements of
§ 109(h)(3)(A). Still others believe it invokes the court's discretion.
There appears to be no consensus as to the definition; however, a
combination of the varying definitions may provide more guidance.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. The court opined § 109(h)(3)(A) would be rendered "meaningless" if a court could
not take into consideration the fact that an exigent circumstance arises within five days of the
debtor's request for counseling. Id.
184. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 6:265
2008] THE PRE-PETITION CREDIT COUNSELING REQUIREMENT 307
First, a few courts merely look to the certification itself, as to
whether it was sworn to and signed by the debtor.18 5 This interpreta-
tion goes back to the form of the certification and fails to add any
substance to the inclusion of this Subsection by Congress, making the
Subsection superfluous. Therefore, a more meaningful interpretation
of the phrase "satisfactory to the court" is required.
Other courts tie the language "satisfactory to the court" to the
debtor's satisfaction of the requirements of § 109(h)(3)(A)(i) and (ii);
in other words, if a debtor fails to meet the requirements of either
§ 109(h)(3)(A)(i) or (ii), then the debtor accordingly fails
§ 109(h)(3)(A)(iii).18 6 This interpretation is faulty by failing to give
independent significance to Subsection (iii). As set forth in the statu-
tory language, there are three elements in § 109(h)(3)(A), represented
by the three subsections: (i), (ii), and (iii).187 Courts appear to agree
that because the elements are listed in the conjunctive, by the word
"and," a debtor must satisfy each element in order to be entitled to an
exception. 188 However, courts interpreting § 109(h)(3)(A)(iii) to
mean merely the first two elements are satisfied fail to require an in-
dependent showing under § 109(h)(3)(A)(iii).
Finally, some courts find this provision makes the courts "gatekeep-
ers,"1 89 invoking the courts' discretion. 190 Specifically, the Bankruptcy
185. See In re Morales, No. 806-70854-478, 2006 WL 2050555, at *4 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. May 24,
2006) (finding the debtor's certifications were satisfactory because they followed the forms pro-
posed by the court and contained the signatures of both the debtor and her attorney); In re
Westenberger, No. 0610477-BKC-RBR, 2006 WL 1105008, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2006)
(asserting the initial certification must be "sworn to and signed by the Debtor before a notary
public").
186. See In re Walton, No. 07-41086-293, 2007 WL 980430, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 5,
2007) (holding § 109(h)(3)(A)(iii) "does not contain a substantive requirement, but merely di-
rects the court to make an independent inquiry into whether the certification meets the first two
elements"); In re Carey, 341 B.R. 798, 803 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) (finding the "Debtor's Re-
quest cannot be 'satisfactory to the court' since it does not meet the requirements of
§ 109(h)(3)(A)(ii)"); In re Wallert, 332 B.R. 884, 888 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005) ("[B]ecause the
Debtor's certification lacks proof of one of the statutory requirements for an exemption, it can-
not be 'satisfactory to the court."'); In re LaPorta, 332 B.R. 879, 882 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005)
(finding a debtor's statement is not satisfactory if the debtor fails to meet § 109(h)(3)(A)(i) and
(ii)).
187. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)(A) (2006).
188. E.g., In re Afolabi, 343 B.R. 195, 199 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2006) (citing In re Wallace, 338
B.R. 399, 401 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006)); In re Henderson, 339 B.R. 34, 37 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2006)).
189. E.g., In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145, 154 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006) (noting the filing of a certifi-
cation under § 109(h)(3)(A) is not a "mere formality," but can be reviewed by court for
adequacy).
190. See In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. 486, 496 n.15 (stating "the additional requirement that the
certification seeking a waiver of the credit counseling requirement be 'satisfactory' is a broad
grant of discretion to the bankruptcy court"); In re Rodriguez, 336 B.R. 462, 473, 473 n.29
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Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit held, in order to give
§ 109(h)(3)(A)(iii) some independent meaning, courts are required to
use their "discretion in making the determinations under subdivisions
(i) and (ii)."191 Yet another definition is "[w]hether the individual
debtor's 'certification' is 'satisfactory' to the court is to be resolved on
a case-by-case basis considering a totality of the particular facts and
circumstances.' 192 However, "a boiler-plate allegation, merely reciting
the statutory language, is inadequate" under Subsection (iii), "even if
that allegation is certified.' 93
In order to give independent significance to the language, courts
cannot merely equate satisfactory with meeting the elements of
§ 109(h)(3)(A) (i) and (ii). Clearly, if either one of the first two sub-
sections is not satisfied, then a court needs not reach the third deter-
mination; however, that does not mean a satisfactory showing under
the first two subsections will guarantee that the third subsection is
met. Furthermore, merely stating that § 109(h)(3)(A)(iii) is a proce-
dural or technical determination is faulty. However, stating that
§ 109(h)(3)(A)(iii) requires the use of discretion seems to be closer to
Congress's intent, as long as discretion involves looking at the certifi-
cation as a whole, the form and content, to determine whether it
meets the court's satisfaction. Although still somewhat vague, it seems
to meld the varying interpretations into a review of adequacy of the
(Bankr. D. Idaho 2005) (noting the "satisfactory to the court" requirement "raise[d] the possibil-
ity of less than fully uniform treatment as between districts or even within a given district, as
what is satisfactory to one judge might not satisfy another"). The court further asserted that the
use of "shall" in § 109(h)(3)(A) is turned into a discretionary "may" by the inclusion of "satisfac-
tory" in § 109(h)(3)(A)(iii). Id.
191. Dixon v. LaBarge (In re Dixon), 338 B.R. 383, 387 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006) ("It is unclear
what substantive content this requirement has. It is difficult for us to posit a situation where a
court would determine that the requirements of subdivisions (i) and (ii) are met, but, still, is not
satisfactory to the court.").
192. In re Graham, 336 B.R. 292, 296 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2005). The Graham court found the
debtor had the burden of "demonstrating or detailing the background facts that might be 'satis-
factory to the court."' Id. Although stating this definition, the court ultimately held that because
the certification was not signed by the debtor and because the debtor failed to state whether she
even sought pre-petition counseling, her certification was "not satisfactory." Id. at 298. See also
In re Postlethwait, 353 B.R. 428, 430 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006) (holding debtor's minimal attempts
to obtain credit counseling on the day of filing, which was more than five days before the "exi-
gent" event, was unsatisfactory under § 109(h)(3)(A)(iii), and meriting a waiver would "reward
token and nominal effort"); In re Rodriguez, 336 B.R. 462, 473 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2005) ("Noth-
ing, as yet, tells the bankruptcy courts what should guide their discretion or satisfy them. The
key, almost certainly, will be the specific factual circumstances described in the certification. If
not sufficiently exigent and compelling, the certification will not be satisfactory to the court
193. Rodriguez, 336 B.R. at 474 (noting such boiler-plate allegations would also be inadequate
for subsection (ii)).
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certification under a totality of the circumstances: procedural, techni-
cal, and substantive.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
Following the tortuous path of interpretation by the courts, it is evi-
dent that guidance is clearly needed. Courts have two options when
dealing with the pre-petition credit counseling requirement and the
exception under § 109(h)(3): require strict compliance or allow for
"substantial compliance." Several courts have allowed "substantial
compliance" with the requirements of § 109(h)(3) to suffice. 194 How-
ever, substantial compliance in the face of a clear mandate does not
suffice. 195 As one court stated:
194. See In re Bricksin, 346 B.R. 497 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006). In Brickson, the debtors ob-
tained pre-petition credit counseling approximately thirteen months prior to filing bankruptcy.
Id. at 499. As part of the pre-petition credit counseling, the debtors proceeded under a debt
repayment plan, paying over eleven thousand dollars to their creditors over a period of nine
months. Id. at 500. Upon determining that they were no longer able to maintain the payments
under the debt repayment plan, they filed for Chapter 7 relief. Id. The Chapter 7 trustee filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the requirements of § 109(h), asserting their credit
counseling fell outside of the 180-day window. Id. at 498. Based upon the court's interpretation
of congressional intent, the court found the debtors' continued participation in the debt repay-
ment plan within the 180-day window pre-petition fulfilled the "spirit," if not the technical re-
quirements, of § 109(h) and, on equitable grounds, refused to dismiss the case. Id. at 502. See
also In re Henderson, 364 B.R. 906, 913 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007) (holding that because
§ 109(h)(3) was not jurisdictional, it was a waivable eligibility requirement that a court could
"overlook"); In re Nichols, 362 B.R. 88, 96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying trustee's motion to
dismiss because under the totality of the circumstances, a strict interpretation of § 109(h)(3)
would result in manifest injustice to the debtors, whose failure to comply with the strict require-
ments was solely a result of attorney error); In re Bass, No. 06-21011-L, 2006 WL 1593978
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. June 9, 2006). In Bass, the debtor obtained the credit counseling over forty-
five days after filing her bankruptcy petition. Id. at *1. Finding § 109(h)(1) was an eligibility
requirement, the court held, based upon a totality of the circumstances, the debtor had substan-
tially complied with § 109(h)(1). Id. at *5. The court stated "[t]o hold otherwise would be to
render an overly technical reading of the Bankruptcy Code at odds with its expressed purposes."
Id. But see Clippard v. Bass, 365 B.R. 131, 137 (W.D. Tenn. 2007) (reversing the bankruptcy
court's order and holding that because the requirements for a § 109(h)(3)(A) certification were
so precise, bankruptcy courts have no discretion to allow substantial compliance by debtors); In
re Parker, 351 B.R. 790 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006). In Parker, the court denied a debtor's motion to
dismiss his case based upon his failure to comply with the pre-petition credit counseling require-
ment. Id. at 799. The court found that to allow the debtor to do so "would make a mockery of
the bankruptcy process." Id. The court held the debtor waived the requirements of § 109(h) and
he was judicially estopped from arguing his ineligibility when faced with the sale of his pre-
petition assets by the trustee. Id. See also Mendez v. Salven (In re Mendez), 367 B.R. 109, 118
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007) (holding debtor intentionally waived strict compliance with the require-
ments of § 109(h) and affirming denial of debtor's motion to dismiss).
195. See Rodriguez, 336 B.R. at 477 ("The law is what it is. The Court is obligated to enforce it
as written."). See also In re Ruckdaschel, 364 B.R. 724, 733 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007) ("[T]he
bankruptcy courts' equity powers do not license the Court to rewrite statutes in favor of parties
based on extenuating circumstances."); In re Dillard, No. 06-30128-RFH, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS
3485, at *16 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2006):
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The utility of the counseling may be debatable in some cases, but
the requirement that it be obtained is not. An overly liberal ap-
proach to granting exemptions under § 109(h)(3)(A) would vitiate
the evident Congressional intent that almost all individuals must un-
dergo the counseling before, and as a precondition to, filing
bankruptcy. 19
6
Based upon the plain meaning of the terms and evident congressional
intent of pre-petition credit counseling, courts should judge a certifica-
tion for an exception under § 109(h)(3)(A) as follows.
As a preliminary matter, the procedural requirements must comply
with the revised Official Voluntary Petition Form and Exhibit D. Ex-
hibit D, in tandem with the motion required under the October 2006
form, should be considered the "certification" required by
§ 109(h)(3)(A) and be relabeled as such. Exhibit D provides the certi-
fication language of 28 U.S.C. § 1746, signed under penalty of perjury.
To alleviate any confusion, Exhibit D should include a reference to
the requirements of § 109(h)(3)(A), further defining the terms in the
statute as follows.
First, to meet the requirements of § 109(h)(3)(A)(i), a debtor must
allege exigent circumstances meriting a waiver, which will likely in-
clude some type of imminent creditor collection activity but must be
something outside of the normal prospective debtor's situation, as any
other reading would vitiate the exception. However, the exigent cir-
cumstances requirement should not be read to require "extreme" cir-
cumstances. The second part of the analysis under § 109(h)(3)(A)(i),
the "merits a waiver" analysis, will require a debtor to show how his
or her exigent circumstances are different than the typical prospective
debtor.
Second, to meet the requirements of § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii), a debtor
must make several independent showings. First, a debtor must use
reasonable efforts to contact several approved agencies in his or her
district. One agency is insufficient and does not show diligence in at-
tempting to meet the requirements. A debtor should list the names of
the agencies contacted, when they were contacted, and how these
agencies were located by the debtor. Also, a debtor should allege he
or she was unable to obtain the credit counseling. This requirement
That [a debtor] was proceeding in good faith, was given bad advice by a disreputable
business, was not informed of the requirement by the Clerk's Office, and was in a state
of extreme distress due to the foreclosure of her home may make her extremely sympa-
thetic, but they do not make her above the law .... [Tihe judges' hands are tied, and
they can do little more than complain as they terminate cases filed by honest but unfor-
tunate debtors who failed to obtain pre[-]petition credit counseling.
Id.
196. Rodriguez, 336 B.R. at 477.
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should focus on what the obstacle was that thwarted a debtor's effort
to get the counseling, which in many cases may be the same reason
asserted as an exigent circumstance. A debtor should specifically state
the reasons why he or she was unable to obtain the counseling. Addi-
tionally, the debtor must allege that he or she attempted to contact the
agencies at issue at least five days pre-petition and specifically provide
the dates and times when the specific agencies were contacted.
Last, a court should judge whether the certification is satisfactory by
considering a totality of the circumstances: procedural and substan-
tive. Procedural considerations should include whether the certifica-
tion is in the correct format, including whether it uses the penalty of
perjury language of 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Substantive considerations
should include whether the certification is factually sufficient to fulfill
the exception, allowing for the courts to exercise a certain amount of
discretion in cases involving exigencies.
Although these standards comport with the plain meaning and con-
gressional purpose, the question is revisited: what is the congressional
purpose for imposing the pre-petition credit counseling requirement?
Can such counseling halt a foreclosure sale scheduled in the upcoming
six days? The Congressional purpose was obtainment of pre-petition
credit counseling within the six months preceding the bankruptcy.
What does a counseling five days or even one day prior succeed in
doing, other than providing yet another mandatory requirement to
fulfill before a bankruptcy filing? Can that much information or
debtor education be gained from a counseling session a few days
before the filing, when a debtor is already facing recognized "exigent
circumstances?" It appears to be a little too little too late.
Adding to this quandary, the temporary deferral provided for in
§ 109(h)(3)(B) flies in the face of congressional purpose. Is this post-
petition credit counseling different than the financial management
course taken post-petition, or is it merely the same as the pre-petition
counseling aimed at steering a debtor away from bankruptcy?
Whatever the answer, both options are questionable. First, if it is no
different than the financial management course, what is the purpose
of having a debtor engage in this course twice? It appears to be a
sanction. However, if it is decidedly different, then the question be-
comes: what goal is accomplished by requiring the debtor to engage in
pre-petition credit counseling post-petition? 197 The reasoning found in
197. See In re Warden, No. 05-23750, 2005 WL 3207630 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Nov. 22, 2005). The
bankruptcy court refused to vacate an order dismissing a debtor's case for failure to comply with
pre-petition credit counseling requirement, noting the fact that the debtor received the counsel-
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Tulper1 98 can and should be applied to the "exemption" found in
§ 109(h)(3) because how can "post-petition" pre-petition credit coun-
seling ever be meaningful after the petition has been filed; it would be
"without purpose or utility," especially one day before a foreclosure,
when a debtor has no realistic chance of negotiating with a lender?
Although debtors who had claimed exemptions under § 109(h)(3)(A)
would be able to have a cognitive focus and participate in the counsel-
ing, the whole effort would be "meaningless" if they had already filed
for relief. In this instance, the purpose of steering the debtor away
from bankruptcy has already been thwarted. And, the draconian mea-
sure of dismissing the case, in the face of an exigent circumstance, is
unfair to say the least.
This assertion is not to do away with the laudatory goals of pre-
petition counseling six months prior to bankruptcy but to point out
the absurdity of requiring such counseling post-petition when all it
does is add yet another financial burden to an already financially
strapped debtor. If the exception is to have any meaning, it should be
seen as an exemption in the truest sense of the word: the debtor is
exempted upon strict compliance with the statutory requirements.
Furthermore, the educational goals of financial literacy are still im-
parted upon the debtor in the required post-petition financial manage-
ment course.
To further the intent of Congress and to meet the laudatory goals of
financial literacy, such counseling should be provided in other forums,
not just as a bankruptcy requirement. As a society, we can state that
we value financial literacy and make it part of our education process.
As stated by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Florida in In re Petit-Louis:
[The credit counseling] should be required for and provided to
every high school senior as a prerequisite to graduation. So timed,
the counseling would be of immense value to millions and would no
doubt have a positive effect in reducing the number of bankruptcy
ing post-petition did not overcome the failure to meet the requirements of § 109(h)(3)(A). Id. at
*3. The court stated:
The apparent congressional hope in enacting the credit counseling requirement is that
focusing on a budget analysis with the help of a credit counseling professional might
obviate the need for seeking bankruptcy relief for some debtors. That objective is not
achieved by obtaining credit counseling after the case has been filed.
Id. This statement overlooks that the very same statutory section, specifically § 109(h)(3)(B),
does provide and infers the validity of such "post-petition" pre-petition credit counseling. See
also In re Carey, 341 B.R. 798. 803 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) ("Obtaining credit counseling post-
petition does not achieve Congress'[s] purpose.").
198. In re Tulper, 345 B.R. 322 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006). For a brief discussion on Tulper, see
supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
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filings of certain types of cases. Unfortunately, the requirement for
creditor counseling immediately prior to and as a prerequisite to
filing bankruptcy is similar to locking the barn after the horse is
gone. The present statutory requirement is the equivalent of requir-
ing a person who has suffered a heart attack to listen to a lecture on
exercise, diet and the evils of cholesterol before allowing such per-
son to undergo open heart surgery.1 99
This education should start in high schools, when individuals first get
credit cards, and in orientation programs at universities when discuss-
ing financial aid and student loans. Furthermore, there should be a
requirement of credit card lenders and other lenders to educate bor-
rowers on both the obligation of the debt and the consequences of
default. Although these are discrete instances of learning, such in-
stances can create an overall foundation for one's future financial
health.
VII. CONCLUSION
In BAPCPA, Congress set forth a bold new proposition with the
pre-petition credit counseling requirement. Its purpose was clear: pre-
petition financial education to steer prospective debtors away from
bankruptcy. In an attempt to be realistic, it set forth exceptions to the
requirement. However, an exception that is difficult or impossible to
satisfy or that serves no purpose once satisfied belies reason. That is
not to say an exception for exigent circumstances should not exist. It
should, however, have clear elements that can be met by an eligible
debtor. And, if met, a debtor should receive an absolute exemption
from the pre-petition credit counseling requirement because any other
result would not comport with the goal of pre-petition education.
199. In re Petit-Louis, 344 B.R. 696, 701 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006).

